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vAbstract
In this thesis the behavior of banks in ﬁnancial markets which banks frequently use to obtain
short-term as well as long-term ﬁnancing is studied. In the ﬁrst chapter we incorporate an in-
terbank market for collateralized lending among banks into a dynamic, stochastic, general equi-
librium (DSGE) framework to analyze the impact of variations in the expected value of the
collateral on the interbank lending volume. We ﬁnd that a central bank which decides to lower
the haircut on eligible collateral in repurchase agreements is able to stimulate interbank markets.
In the second chapter a microeconomic model of bank behavior on the interbank market is set
up to analyze the impact of risk-taking behavior of interbank borrowing banks and uncertainty
about their balance sheet quality on the lending behavior of interbank lending banks. It is found
that the disruptions on the interbank market are the result of optimal behavior on the part of inter-
bank lending banks in response to the uncertainty about the balance sheet quality of an interbank
borrowing bank. In the third chapter we use monthly data on German bank bond spreads and
regress it on bank-speciﬁc risk factors to assess the degree of market discipline in the German
bank bond market. The regression results for the whole German bank bond market indicate that
the bond spread does not show signs of market discipline. However, a structural break analysis
uncovers that since the beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis the German bank bond market exhibits
at least a weak form of market discipline for bonds issued by medium-size and large banks.
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In this thesis the interbank market and the bank bond market which banks frequently use to ob-
tain short-term as well as long-term ﬁnancing is studied. In the ﬁrst chapter we examine the
market for secured interbank lending and analyze the effects of unconventional monetary policy
on the behavior of banks in the interbank market.
In the twenty years preceding the current ﬁnancial crisis all major economies have witnessed an
environment with low macroeconomic volatility also known as the “Great Moderation” where
central banks in industrialized countries were using the interest rate at which banks can obtain
liquidity on the interbank market as its instrument to anchor the inﬂation expectations around a
speciﬁedlevel.1 However, thewaycentralbanksconductmonetarypolicychangedwiththeonset
of the ﬁnancial crisis. Central banks no longer rely exclusively on traditional interest rate policy
but also prolong the maturities for repurchase agreements (“Repos”), widen the set of collateral
accepted in Repo transactions, and reduce the haircut applied to speciﬁc types of assets. All these
measures aim at reviving the interbank market and stabilizing the ﬁnancial system as a whole.
The interbank market is important for a central bank because it is the market which is most di-
rectly affected by monetary policy decisions and hence is the preferred transmission channel to
implement the monetary policy strategy of a central bank. However, to enable economists to
analyze the macroeconomic consequences of a central bank resorting to a richer set of monetary
policy tools that are targeted to change the liquidity situation among banks requires to imple-
ment an interbank market in modern macroeconomic models. In models of Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999) or Markovic (2006) banks are ﬁnancial intermediaries who channel funds
between borrowers and lenders. Although they do exhibit proﬁt maximizing behavior, banks in
these models are assumed to break-even each period. Only in recent times a couple of DSGE
models emerged which explicitly incorporate an active banking sector (Gerali, Neri, Sessa, and
Signoretti (2009), DeWalque, Pierrard, and Rouabah (2009), Dib (2009)).
Our model features a heterogenous ﬁnancial sector that consists of two different types of banks
whose behavior is the outcome of explicit optimization problems and which trade central bank
1 The term “Great Moderation” goes back to a paper by Stock and Watson (2003) to describe the decline in the
output volatility in the United States since the early 1980s.
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reserves amongst each other on the interbank market. By assumption an interbank borrowing
bank can only offer risky assets as collateral in return for interbank liquidity. Because we restrict
the amount of interbank lending by introducing a collateral constraint, the volume of interbank
lending depends on the expected value of the collateral in the next period. If the value of the
underlying collateral is expected to rise an interbank lending bank accepts the risky asset as col-
lateral for an interbank loan independent of the collateral policy of the central bank. However, if
the collateral value is expected to decline and the central bank is unwilling to accept this risky as-
set as eligible asset in a main reﬁnancing operation, the volume of interbank lending will decline.
Hence, within this model the central bank faces a situation where the decline in interbank lending
activity is not caused by concerns about direct counterparty risk but due to concerns about the
value of the collateral pledged by a commercial bank in return for an interbank loan.
We allow for unconventional monetary policy in our model by introducing a haircut rule in addi-
tion to the interest rate rule to allow for the re-use of collateral in repurchase agreements with the
central bank. To differentiate between different qualities of collateral the central bank applies a
haircut to eligible collateral. Within our framework we analyze the impact of such haircut policy
on the lending activity on the interbank market. Because a central bank can vary the haircut on
certain asset classes in our model, it is in the position to increase or decrease the liquidity supply
to the banking sector even if the interest rate is at or near the zero lower bound. This measure is
an alternative to providing liquidity to commercial banks directly and has the advantage that it
does not completely crowd out the lending activity on the interbank market.
Another feature that distinguishes our study from other studies mentioned above is the distinction
between the fundamental price of capital which is equivalent to Tobin’s q and the market price
of capital which is used to determine the value of the collateral a borrowing bank can offer to an
interbank lending bank in return for an interbank loan or to a central bank as eligible collateral
in repurchase agreements. If these two values are different we consider it to be a bubble. The
effect of such a bubble is an increase in the amount of collateral available for borrowing on the
interbank market. In terms of modeling these two variables we rely on the setup introduced by
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) who extend the framework of Bernanke et al. (1999). By including
an exogenous bubble process we try to contribute to the ongoing debate in the literature whether
central banks should respond to asset prices as well.
Another aspect referred to in our paper contributes to the ongoing research on the exit strategy
of a central bank engaged in unconventional monetary policy. In our model the central bank is
assumed to reduce the haircut on eligible collateral in Repo transactions after the burst of an
asset price bubble took place. In this context we simulate the effects of different exit strategies
xfrom such unconventional monetary policy on the economy and give recommendations about the
preferable strategy based on the variances computed across different exit scenarios.
Our results conﬁrm the results of Dib (2009) who shows that a ﬁnancial sector helps to dampen
monetary policy shocks to the real economy. In addition, we can show that if bubbles inﬂate the
prices used to assess the collateral value in interbank lending and eligible collateral in repurchase
agreements, the ﬁnancial sector ampliﬁes shocks to the real economy. We can show that a lower
haircut has a signiﬁcant and positive impact on the whole economy in the short run. The only
drawback is an increase in inﬂation after the liquidity supply has increased. Moreover, we are
able to conﬁrm the result of Bernanke and Gertler (1999) in our model framework and suggest
not to include asset prices in the interest rate rule. But this does not mean that the central bank
should not react to asset prices at all. In fact instead of incorporating asset prices in the interest
rate rule a central bank should rather use the instrument of a haircut rule to react to supposed as-
set price deviations from their fundamental value. We show that the incorporation of asset prices
in the haircut rule signiﬁcantly reduces the macroeconomic volatility in a simulated boom-bust
cycle. Based on the variances of output, inﬂation, and ﬁnancial market variables computed from
a simulation of the effects of different exit strategies from a haircut rule, our model recommends
to communicate the exit date in advance and stick to the announced exit date.
Chaptertwoconcentratesontheinteractionbetweenbankswhichdemandinterbankliquidityand
banks with excess liquidity on the interbank market. At the time the house prices in the United
States plummeted ﬁnancial institutions held large exposures of mortgage-related securities as
they seemed to offer an attractive risk-return proﬁle. As losses in those securities accumulated
in the balance sheets of banks worldwide, the trust in the stability of ﬁnancial institutions began
to vanish and reﬁnancing started to become an issue for banks. Especially as the liquidity on the
important interbank market where banks with excess liquidity used to lend to banks with liquid-
ity demand dried up.
Interbank markets in economics have been introduced by Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) who
show that an interbank market where banks can borrow and lend liquidity is optimal to cope with
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. This emphasizes the importance of the interbank market for the
liquidity management of banks. This paper focuses on a speciﬁc form of market failure which
has been observed in the market for interbank liquidity since the beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis,
namely liquidity hoarding. This liquidity hoarding on part of banks has been conﬁrmed empir-
ically by Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen (2009) for the unsecured Euro interbank market, for
the US Federal Funds market (Ashcraft, Mcandrews, and Skeie (2011), Afonso, Kovner, and
Schoar (2011), and Taylor and Williams (2009)) and by Acharya and Merrouche (2010) for the
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UK Sterling money market.
However, while liquidity hoarding by banks is conﬁrmed by the data, there are two competing
theoretical explanations why individual behavior of banks jointly led to disruptions on the inter-
bank market. One strand of the literature argues that the observed liquidity hoarding by banks
is the result of concerns about its own future liquidity needs, that is, banks show precautionary
behavior which can be explained by an internal motive for holding liquidity. In a model of in-
complete markets Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2009b) show that the price volatility due to the lack
of hedging completely against aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks leads to the holding of excess
reserves by banks. In contrast, Freixas and Jorge (2008b) or Heider et al. (2009) argue that it
is rather an external motive, namely, that each bank is concerned about the balance sheet condi-
tions of other banks which leads to the tensions on the interbank market. As the balance sheet
quality of a bank declines, the counterparty risk incurred by lending to this bank increases as the
probability of default rises. Freixas and Jorge (2008b) show that interbank market imperfections
results in an equilibrium with credit rationing and a study of Heider et al. (2009) conﬁrms that
asymmetric information about the counterparty risk can lead to a breakdown of the interbank
market.
In this paper a model with a heterogenous banking sector is developed where some of the banks
possess excess liquidity while others lack sufﬁcient funds to ﬁnance a risky portfolio investment.
The model developed in this paper is based on Rajan (1994). However, in the model of Rajan
(1994) it is assumed that a bank possesses sufﬁcient own funds to implement the desired policy.
This assumption no longer holds in this model where a bank is required to obtain liquidity on
the interbank market to be able to make a portfolio decision. Hence, the interbank market in
the model allows for a transfer of liquidity from banks with a liquidity surplus to banks with a
liquidity deﬁcit. It is due to the introduction of an interbank market that the impact of the lending
policy of banks in the interbank market on the riskiness of the balance sheet of banks with a
liquidity demand can be analyzed.
The counterparty risk in this model depends on the quality of the balance sheet and the portfolio
choice made by a bank. It is assumed that the counterparty risk involved in interbank lending is
not directly observable. But interbank lending banks possess a costless technology which allows
them to imperfectly assess the quality of a bank’s balance sheet. The interbank market functions
smoothly if interbank lending banks are sufﬁciently conﬁdent to be able to correctly assess the
counterparty risk involved in providing liquidity on the interbank market. However, it is shown
that the liquidity on the interbank market can dry up if the reliability of the technology used by
interbank lending banks to assess the counterparty risk involved in interbank lending falls below
xiia certain threshold. As banks are then unable to differentiate between high and low counterparty
risks they ﬁnd it optimal not to lend on the interbank market even if their analysis signals that
the true counterparty risk is low. Moreover, the model implies that if lending banks in the in-
terbank market care about counterparty risk they are able to exert control on the risks taken by
banks. Moreover, this model allows one to analyze the effect of a central bank’s liquidity policy
on the interbank market. The conclusion is that the central bank is able to reduce the liquidity
risk but the level of counterparty risk remains unaltered as banks are reluctant to actively reduce
their exposures. Another result of the model is that due to the fact that the central bank supplies
liquidity to banks inelastically it is unable to control the risk-taking behavior of banks.
In the third chapter we examine if investors in the German bank bond market exert market disci-
pline on bond issuing banks by continuously processing information on bank risk and incorpo-
rating this information in their investment decision. If such a channel exists, the bond yield in
the German bank bond market correctly reﬂects the risk information about each individual bank.
The third pillar introduced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in the second Basel
accords (“Basel II”) was intended to strengthen the market discipline by imposing speciﬁc dis-
closure requirements on banks to help market participants in their assessment of a bank’s capital
adequacy and other risk parameters of an individual bank. The rationale for the introduction of
a third pillar was to reduce the asymmetric information between the bank and potential investors
and to ensure a continuous monitoring by the market in addition to a less frequent evaluation
of a bank by the national supervisory authority. Given the information about a bank’s capital
adequacy and its exposure to several kinds of risk it is expected that investors’ required return
is higher the higher the reported risks and the lower the capital which is able to absorb losses
stemming from those risks. The idea that the supervision by market participants can be used to
complement the efforts by the supervisory authority has been empirically assessed ﬁrst by Flan-
nery and Sorescu (1996) and Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000). Bliss and Flannery (2001)
emphasize that market discipline is a combination of “monitoring” and “inﬂuence”. The aspect
of monitoring by market participants requires that investors are perfectly informed about bank
risk and use this information to determine the fair market price of a debt or equity instrument
issued by an individual bank. The second component of market discipline requires that a bank
adjusts its level of bank risk given that it is monitored by market participants to avoid an increase
in its future funding costs.
Most empirical studies examine market discipline with a focus on monitoring, that is, the ﬁrst
component of market discipline and have a focus on the banking industry in the United States.
For example, Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Jagtiani, Kaufman, and Lemieux (2002), and Covitz,
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Hancock, and Kwast (2004) examine how market discipline was affected by a change to the setup
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation introduced by the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration Improvement Act (“FDICIA”). As a result of this change in the legal framework in 1991
where the US government basically committed itself to a “no bail-out”-strategy, studies which
examine US data of the post-FDICIA period ﬁnd that bondholders are effectively monitoring
bank risk. An assessment of the degree of market discipline in the European banking industry
has been done by Sironi (2003).
To answer the question if the market participants assume the role meant for them by the super-
visory authorities and monitor the banks closely to ask for higher spreads if banks increase their
risk-taking we construct a rich data set which contains bond-speciﬁc and bank-speciﬁc informa-
tion to study the extent of market discipline in the German bank bond market. In a ﬁrst step
we analyze if the German bank bond market as a whole shows signs of weak or strong market
discipline by means of a ﬁxed effects regression. In a second step we split up the sample into
three groups according to a bank’s size and examine if market discipline is more important for a
subsample of banks. In the last step of our empirical analysis we allow for two structural breaks
to examine if the market discipline within each of the subsamples has been subject to variations
over time. The results of our paper suggest that it is important to distinguish between small,
medium and large banks and at the same time to allow for structural breaks in order to uncover
market discipline in the German bank bond market. The regression results for the whole German
bank bond market indicate that the bond spread in the German bank bond market does not show
signs of market discipline. In addition, for neither of the subsamples the existence of market
discipline can be conﬁrmed for the whole sample period. However, the structural break analysis
uncovered that since the beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis the German bank bond market exhibits
at least a weak form of market discipline for bonds issued by medium-size and large banks.
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Asset Prices, Collateral and
Unconventional Monetary Policy in a
DSGE Model
“What appears to be in substance a direct transfer of mortgage and mortgage-backed securities of questionable
pedigree from an investment bank to the Federal Reserve seems to test the time honored central bank mantra in time
of crisis-“lend freely at high rates against good collateral”-to the point of no return”
(Remarks by Paul Volcker at a Luncheon of the Economic Club of New York on April 8, 2008)
1.1 Introduction
In the twenty years preceding the current ﬁnancial crisis all major economies have witnessed an
environment with low macroeconomic volatility also known as the ‘Great Moderation’.1 During
this time the central banks in industrialized countries set the policy rate to anchor the inﬂation
expectations around a speciﬁed level. Although the twenty years before the Great Recession
is by and large attributable to good policy some studies (see for example the studies Primiceri
(2005) and Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010)) argue that central banks were fortunate
as well. Hence, it comes not as a surprise that the way central banks conduct monetary policy
changed with the onset of the crisis. Central banks no longer rely exclusively on traditional in-
terest rate policy but also prolong the maturities of repurchase agreements (“Repos”), widen the
set of collateral accepted in Repo transactions, and reduce the haircut applied to speciﬁc types of
assets. Those measures can be subsumed under the heading of unconventional monetary policy.
1 The term ‘Great Moderation’ goes back to a paper by Stock and Watson (2003) to describe the decline in the
output volatility in the United States since the early 1980s.
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So far these measures have been conﬁned to crisis times and were aimed at reviving the interbank
market and stabilizing the ﬁnancial systems as a whole.
The interbank market is important for a central bank because it is the market which is most di-
rectly affected by monetary policy decisions and hence is the preferred transmission channel to
implement the monetary policy strategy of a central bank. To enable economists to analyze the
macroeconomic consequences of a central bank which resorts to a richer set of monetary policy
tools that are targeted to change the liquidity situation among banks, requires to implement an
interbank market in modern macroeconomic models. In models of Bernanke et al. (1999) or
Markovic (2006) banks are ﬁnancial intermediaries which channel funds between borrowers and
lenders. Although they do exhibit proﬁt maximizing behavior banks in these models are assumed
to break-even each period. Only in recent times a couple of DSGE models emerged which ex-
plicitly incorporate an active banking sector (Gerali et al. (2009), DeWalque et al. (2009), Dib
(2009)).
Our model features a heterogeneous ﬁnancial sector which consists of two different types of
banks whose behavior is the outcome of explicit optimization problems and which trade central
bank reserves amongst each other on the interbank market. The way the interbank market is
modeled in the literature is different from our setup. Dib (2009) for example splits up the re-
sponsibilities of a bank by assuming two separate entities: a savings and a lending bank. The
“interbank market” in Dib (2009) is represented by the commercial bank in our model setup.
A setup similar to Dib (2009) is employed by DeWalque et al. (2009) but here both banks are
assumed to operate in a competitive environment and not in a monopolistic competitive envi-
ronment as in Dib (2009). While Gerali et al. (2009) claim to model an interbank market, in
their model in equilibrium no interaction among wholesale banks takes place. Other studies that
examine interbank liquidity ﬂows are, for example Ewerhart and Tapking (2008), Allen, Carletti,
and Gale (2009a) and Freixas and Jorge (2008a), however, these do not incorporate their microe-
conomic model into a DSGE framework.
By assumption an interbank borrowing bank can only offer risky assets as collateral in return
for interbank liquidity and the volume of interbank lending depends on the expected value of
the collateral in the next period. If the value of the underlying collateral is expected to rise, an
interbank lending bank accepts the risky asset as collateral for an interbank loan independent of
the collateral policy of the central bank. However, if the collateral value is expected to decline
and the central bank is unwilling to accept this risky asset as eligible asset in a main reﬁnancing
operation the volume of interbank lending will decline. Hence, within this model the central
bank faces a situation where the decline in interbank lending activity is not caused by concerns
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about direct counterparty risk but due to concerns about the value of the collateral pledged by a
commercial bank in return for an interbank loan.
Only recently Gertler and Karadi (2009) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) incorporate unconven-
tional monetary policy into their models to assess the effects of these policies on the macroe-
conomy.2 We allow for unconventional monetary policy in our model by introducing a haircut
rule in addition to the interest rate rule to analyze the role of collateral in repurchase agreements
with the central bank. To differentiate between different qualities of collateral the central bank
is able to apply different haircuts to the securities within the set of eligible collateral. Recent
papers which incorporate a haircut into their model set are Ashcraft, Garleanu, and Pedersen
(2010), Gorton and Metrick (2009), Adrian and Shin (2009), Curdia and Woodford (2010), and
Schabert (2010). Within our framework we analyze the impact of such a haircut policy on the
lending activity of banks on the interbank market. Because a central bank can vary the haircut on
certain asset classes in our model, it is in the position to increase or decrease the liquidity supply
to the banking sector even if the interest rate is at or near the zero lower bound. This policy is an
alternative to providing liquidity to commercial banks directly and has the advantage that it does
not completely crowd out the lending activity on the interbank market.
Another feature that distinguishes our study from other studies mentioned above is the distinction
between the fundamental price of capital which is equivalent to Tobin’s q and the market price
of capital which is used to determine the value of the collateral a borrowing bank can offer to an
interbank lending bank in return for an interbank loan or to a central bank as eligible collateral
in repurchase agreements. If these two values are different we consider it to be a bubble. The
effect of such a bubble is an increase in the amount of collateral available for borrowing in the
interbank market. To model these two variables we rely on the setup introduced by Bernanke and
Gertler (1999) who extend the framework of Bernanke et al. (1999). By including an exogenous
bubble process we try to contribute to the ongoing debate in the literature whether central banks
should respond to asset prices as well.
Our results conﬁrm the results of other studies with an interbank market that a ﬁnancial sector
helps to dampen monetary policy shocks to the real economy. In addition, we exemplify that
if bubbles inﬂate the prices used to determine the value of the collateral a bank can offer to an
interbank lending bank in return for an interbank loan or to a central bank as eligible collateral in
repurchase agreements, the presence of a ﬁnancial sector ampliﬁes shocks to the real economy.
By lowering the haircut which is equivalent to a central bank’s reaction to enlarge the set of ad-
missible collateral, the central bank has a signiﬁcant and positive impact on the whole economy
2 A study of unconventional monetary policy which also places a big emphasis on the central bank’s balance sheet
has recently been conducted by Curdia and Woodford (2010).
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in the short run. The only drawback is an increase in inﬂation after the liquidity supply on the
interbank market has increased.
In addition, we examine if central banks should target asset prices. First, we know that this is a
decision which has to be taken by politics. Nevertheless in the line of a pure economic argumen-
tation we deem it appropriate to lean-against the wind. As market prices amplify the volatility,
both the interest rate rule as well as the collateral policy can be used to dampen a boom-bust
cycle. According to our metric, however, the haircut rule is more appropriate for this task.
Within this model setup we analyze the long run effects of a “leaning-against-the wind”-policy
and contribute to the ongoing research on the exit strategy of a central bank engaged in un-
conventional monetary policy measures. Conditional on a reduction in the haircut on eligible
collateral in Repo transactions we simulate the long run effects from such unconventional mon-
etary policy for the economy and give recommendations about the preferable strategy based on
the variances of output, inﬂation and ﬁnancial market variables computed across different exit
scenarios. Based on this metric our model recommends to communicate the exit date in advance
and stick to the announced exit date. If the central bank reacts to asset price movements all vari-
ables can be stabilized with the important exception of inﬂation which is positive throughout.
This is due to the fact that keeping the haircut low for a prolonged time period, the amount of
liquidity allocated to the interbank market is rising considerably over time.
This paper is structured in the following way. In Section 1.2 the model setup is explained. The
calibration to the data is shown in Section 1.3. We proceed in Section 1.4 by stating important
results such as impulse response functions, comparative statics and the long run effects of asset
price targeting. Section 1.5 ﬁnally concludes.
1.2 Model
The model economy consists of three major blocks: the real sector, the ﬁnancial sector, and the
central bank. The real sector comprises the households and the production sector and is very sim-
ilar to Bernanke et al. (1999) and Christensen and Dib (2008). Each household consumes a ﬁnal
good sold by the retailer and supplies labor to entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs combine household
labor with capital bought from capital good producers to produce an intermediate good which is
sold to retailers. To transfer wealth across periods, households save by holding identical amounts
of deposits both with the interbank borrowing bank and the interbank lending bank. The former
uses these deposits together with interbank liquidity obtained from the interbank lending bank
to grant loans to entrepreneurs. In the relationship between the commercial bank and the en-
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trepreneur a demand side friction is incorporated, which results in an external ﬁnance premium
that depends on the net worth an entrepreneur has accumulated.
The ﬁnancial sector consists of two types of commercial banks which lend and borrow to the
private sector. Independent of the type they have access to central bank liquidity if they possess
eligible collateral to participate in the main reﬁnancing operations of the central bank. It is as-
sumed that the commercial banks are heterogeneous with respect to their balance sheet structure.
One type of commercial bank has highly liquid assets on its balance sheet while the other type of
commercial bank contains less liquid, risky assets.3 In case the latter bank has a liquidity need
they prefer to demand additional liquidity from the interbank market and offer the illiquid, risky
asset as collateral to avoid having to reduce their loans to the private sector. In the following
we will refer to the former group as interbank lending banks and to the latter group as interbank
borrowing banks. In the following subsections the model setup and the optimization problems
faced by each agent are explained. First-order conditions are completely delegated to Appendix
1.B.1.
1.2.1 Household
Households are inﬁnitely lived and maximize consumption and leisure subject to a budget con-
straint. Throughout the model h is attached to variables and parameters to denote an individual
household variable. The instantaneous utility function has the following form
Ut =
Ct(h)1 
c
1   
c
+
(1   Lt(h))1 
l
1   
l
(1.1)
The inﬁnite sum of discounted utility is maximized by the households under the following budget
constraint which is expressed in real terms
Ct(h) + Dt(h) = WtLt(h) +
RD
t 1
t
Dt 1(h) + Pt(h)   Tt(h) (1.2)
The household’s savings are transferred across periods by depositing it with commercial banks.
The gross return paid on household’s deposits is denoted by RD
t . Wt is the wage in real terms
that the household gets from the entrepreneur in exchange for its labor supply. Finally, Pt(h)
denotes transfer payments stemming from proﬁts made by commercial banks, the central bank,
3 This balance sheet structure is the result of some of the commercial banks having the opportunity to invest in an
additional loan to the private sector, while other banks which lack this opportunity invest their remaining liquidity
in a liquid asset like a government bond.
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and retailers. Tt(h) are the lump sum taxes that the government collects from household h.
1.2.2 Entrepreneur
Entrepreneurs are perfectly competitive and produce output that is sold to retailers. As input
factorsinproductiontheyusehomogenouslaborsuppliedfromhouseholdsandcapitalpurchased
from capital producers. The production function is assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas type
Yt = AtK

t L
1 
t (1.3)
Technology At follows an AR(1) process.
Each period the entrepreneur purchases capital Kt+1 to be used in production in the next period.
The difference between the value of capital QtKt and the net worth Nt needs to be ﬁnanced by a
loan Bt taken out from the commercial bank.
Bt = QtKt+1   Nt (1.4)
The interest rate charged on loans is RB
t .
Bernanke et al. (1999) show that an external ﬁnance premium results from the ﬁnancial contract
signed between a bank and the ﬁrm. Dib (2009) implements this ﬁnancial contract in a model
with a banking sector. The expected external marginal ﬁnancing costs are deﬁned as a mark up
over the lending rate. The size of the markup depends on the ratio of the market value of capital
St over the net worth Nt and is given by the following function
R
S
t+1 =
RB
t
t+1

StKt+1
Nt
 
(1.5)
The external ﬁnance premium (StKt+1=Nt)
  depends on the entrepreneur’s leverage ratio which
is deﬁned as StKt+1=Nt. If the leverage ratio increases, the borrower increasingly relies on debt
ﬁnancing which increases the probability of default of the entrepreneur and hence increases the
interest rate charged by a bank.4 The aggregate net worth position of entrepreneurs is evolving
4 The size of the elasticity parameter   that has originally been calibrated by Bernanke et al. (1999) to be 0:05
depends on the standard deviation of the distribution of the entrepreneurs idiosyncratic shocks, agency costs, and
the entrepreneurs’ default threshold. If the parameter   is set to zero, the ﬁnancial accelerator vanishes and the
mark up is zero.
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as
Nt = 

R
S
t St 1Kt  

Rt +

R
!dF(!)RS
t St 1Kt
St 1Kt   Nt

(St 1Kt   Nt)

+ (1   )(1   
)AtK

t H
(1 )

t (1.6)
with  and ! being the survival probability of the entrepreneur and the default probability of
the project the entrepreneur invests in, respectively. Moreover, 1   
 denotes the share of en-
trepreneurial labor in the amount of total labor and  is the parameter of the supervising costs of
the bank.
Note that the loan contract between the entrepreneur and the commercial bank is conditioned on
the market price of capital St and not on the fundamental price Qt. The distinction between the
market price St and the fundamental price Qt has been proposed by Bernanke and Gertler (1999)
in an extension of the model by Bernanke et al. (1999) and allows to model exogenous asset price
bubbles.5
If a unit of capital is valued at the fundamental price Qt, optimal demand for capital guarantees
that the marginal external ﬁnancing costs equal the marginal return on capital
R
Q
t =
 
Rk
t + (1   )Qt

Qt 1
(1.7)
Analogously, if a unit of capital is valued at the market price St and St 6= Qt, optimal demand
for capital satisﬁes
R
S
t =
 
Rk
t + (1   )St

St 1
(1.8)
The fundamental return and the market return on capital are related as follows
R
S
t = R
Q
t

b + (1   b)(1   (1   a)
(St 1   Qt 1)
St
+ "
SQ
t

(1.9)
The parameter a determines the speed of convergence back to the fundamental price Qt and b is
given by b  a(1   ).6 The shock to the fundamental value "
SQ
t is normally distributed with
variance 2
S. In the absence of shocks the market price St moves in line with Qt.
5 For an introduction on asset price bubbles we refer to the seminal paper by Blanchard and Watson (1982).
6 In the case of rational bubbles this value would be one, see Blanchard and Watson (1982).
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1.2.3 Capital Producer
Capital producers provide the capital purchased by entrepreneurs. They use a linear technology
to produce capital and maximize the following objective function
max
It
Et
1 X
t=0

tt
"
Qt
"
It  
i
2

It
It 1
  1
2#
  It
#
: (1.10)
The aggregate capital stock evolves according to
Kt+1 = (1   )Kt +
 
1  
i
2

It
It 1
  1
2!
It (1.11)
where  determines the depreciation rate and investment is subject to quadratic adjustment costs
with i denoting the parameter of those costs. This maximization problem is standard and a
detailed description can be found for example in Dib (2009).
1.2.4 Retailer
To introduce sticky prices we assume that retailers are Calvo (1983) price setters. This is a
common assumption in the New-Keynesian literature and implies that each period there is an
exogenous probability of 1   p that a retailer is able to adjust its price. The rest of the retailers
index their prices to current inﬂation. As in Bernanke et al. (1999) monopolistic retailers buy
the product of the entrepreneur, transform it into ﬁnal output at no cost and sell it to households
or capital goods producers. The expected discounted proﬁt function that the retailer maximizes
takes the form:

R
t =
1 X
k=0

k
pEt 1

t;k
P 
t   P w
t+k
Pt+k
Y

t+k(R)

(1.12)
where    Ct
Ct+k denotes the stochastic discount factor of households as those beneﬁt from the
proﬁts of the retailer. Finally P w
t  Pt
Zt is the nominal price of wholesale goods with Zt as the
gross markup.
1.2.5 Interbank Borrowing Bank j
A commercial bank j maximizes over both the interest RD
t and RB
t and takes the interest rate pre-
vailing on the interbank market RIB
t as given. The liability side of commercial bank j comprises
deposits Dt(j) and interbank loans IBt(j). These funds are invested in loans to entrepreneurs
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Bt(j). A commercial bank j has only risky loans to entrepreneurs on its balance sheet which are
assumed to be less liquid. Moreover, securities backed by collateral from the lending relationship
of a commercial bank j and the entrepreneur are usually not accepted as collateral in repurchase
agreements with the central bank. The balance sheet of a commercial bank j is given by
Assets Liabilities
Loans to Entr. Bt(j) Deposits Dt(j)
Interbank Loans IBt(j)
Table 1.1: Balance Sheet of an Interbank Borrowing Bank j
Each commercial bank j maximizes its proﬁt which is given by the following equation
t(j) =
RB
t 1
t
Bt 1(j)  
RD
t 1
t
Dt 1(j)  
RIB
t 1
t
IBt 1(j) (1.13)
 
d
2

RD
t 1
RD
t 2
  1
2 RD
t 1
t
Dt 1(j)  
b
2

RB
t 1
RB
t 2
  1
2 RB
t 1
t
Bt 1(j) (1.14)
with b and d being the adjustment cost parameter for both interest rates. As deposits and loans
of different commercial banks j are imperfect substitutes for households, the maximization is
subject to the following demand functions for household deposits and entrepreneurial loans.
Dt(j) =

RD
t (j)
RD
t
d
Dt (1.15)
Bt(j) =

RH
t (j)
RH
t
 h
Bt (1.16)
In return for the loan Bt(j) = QtKt   Nt to the entrepreneur a commercial bank j obtains col-
lateral worth QtKt. It is assumed that a commercial bank j possesses a technology to transform
the illiquid capital stock into a marketable security. In the following we will refer to the ﬁnan-
cial instrument generated in this process as asset-backed security. In contrast to the value of the
capital stock QtKt, the value of the asset-backed security portfolio of bank j is given by
ABSt(j) = StKt(j) (1.17)
The assumption that the risky asset ABSt(j) depends on the market price St and not on the
fundamental price Qt allows us to consider the effect of asset price movements on the behavior
of banks in the interbank market where these securities serve as collateral.
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Our model also features a borrowing constraint in a borrower-lender relationship in the form
proposed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). However, in our model the ﬁnancial friction arises
between the commercial bank j and an interbank lending bank k. In order to obtain interbank
liquidity the commercial bank j is able to offer its asset backed securities as collateral. The
commercial bank’s ability to obtain interbank liquidity is limited by the expected value of the
assetportfoliointhenextperiod. Aninterbanklendingbankk encounterstransactioncostswhich
are proportional to the collateral value, (1   mt)St+1Kt(j). These transaction costs comprise
the time to ﬁnd a buyer for the collateral and legal fees paid in the process of liquidating the
pledged assets. Hence, to ensure full repayment in the case of a default of the commercial bank
j, the maximum amount of interbank liquidity granted by a commercial bank k is given by
mtEtSt+1Kt(j). As mt < 1 is assumed, the size of the interbank loan to a bank j will always be
strictly lower than value of the asset portfolio in the next period. The borrowing constraint of a
commercial bank vis-a-vis an interbank lending bank takes the following form7
R
IB
t IBt  mtEtSt+1Kt (1.18)
where mt is the loan-to-value ratio which responds to deviations of the market price of capital
from the fundamental price, ut, to incorporate the reluctance of an interbank lending bank to
provide interbank loans in the presence of asset price bubbles. In log-linearized terms mt is
assumed to follow an AR(1) process8:
mt = mmt 1   2  ut + 
m
t (1.19)
Finally, the balance sheet identity has to hold in all periods t.
Bt(j) = Dt(j) + IBt(j) (1.20)
1.2.6 Interbank Lending Bank k
The activities performed by a commercial bank vis-a-vis the private sector are identical to those
of a commercial bank j. However, compared to a commercial bank j, a commercial bank k
by assumption invests its funds in liquid assets. Thus, the balance sheet depicted in Table 1.2
7 We assume that the borrowing constraint is satisﬁed with equality because the size of the shock is sufﬁciently
small such that the economy remains in the neighborhood of the steady-state. See Iacoviello (2005)
8 In section 4.3 we assume that the loan-to-value ratio is controlled by a supervisory authority and therefore the
deviation of the market price from its fundamental value has to be included
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contains liquid assets in the amount Gt. The liquid assets Gt can be always exchanged against
central bank liquidity if a commercial bank k is willing to supply liquidity on the interbank
market.
Assets Liabilities
Liquid Assets Gt(k) Deposits Dt(k)
Table 1.2: Balance Sheet of an Interbank Lending Bank k
Because the funding structure is identical across commercial banks the interest rate paid on
deposits will be the same across commercial banks. Moreover, we assume that the difference be-
tween the interest rate paid on deposits and the interest obtained from the investment in the liquid
asset Gt is negligible and we are able to ignore it in the optimization problem of the commercial
bank k.
The interest rate on the interbank market RIB
t is endogenously determined by the proﬁt-
maximizing behavior of interbank lending banks and interbank borrowing banks. Hence, a
commercial bank k which considers lending to a commercial bank j takes the policy rate Rt
set by the central bank as given and decides optimally about the amount of liquidity supplied
on the interbank market. Each commercial bank k maximizes its proﬁt function which has the
following form

IB
t (k) = R
Spread
t
 
IBt(k) + M
D
t (k)   Xt(k)

+ RtIBt(k)   R
IB
t M
D
t (k) + R
IB
t Xt(k)
(1.21)
which is mathematically equivalent to RIB
t IBt(k)   Rt(MD
t (k)   Xt(k)) but emphasizes that
the commercial bank k not only cares about the absolute interbank rate but also about the spread
between the interbank interest rate and the policy rate set by the central bank9.
R
Spread
t = R
IB
t   Rt (1.22)
We assume that commercial bank k’s demand for central bank liquidity depends on the optimally
chosen value for interbank lending and excess reserves as follows10
Mt(k) = IBt(k)
Xt(k)
1  (1.23)
9 Compare also Graph 2 with the interbank rate ﬂuctuating around the policy rate
10 Excess reserves can be interpreted as a riskless investment opportunity for a commercial bank k.
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Unlike the Cobb-Douglas production function that takes labor and capital as input factors and
yields goods as output, here the only input factor is the supply of central bank liquidity Mt whose
division among interbank funds and excess reserves is governed by the parameter . If  is equal
to one, there is a one-to-one relationship between the additional liquidity supply of the central
bank and the supply of interbank liquidity on the interbank market. But  is assumed to be
smaller than one to account for the effect of the money multiplier.
The commercial bank k faces the following collateral constraint which limits the volume of
central bank liquidity it can obtain in a main reﬁnancing operation of the central bank
Mt(k) = Gt(k) + (1   ht)ABS
PD
t (k) (1.24)
The liquidity obtainable by each individual commercial bank k is denoted by Mt(k). The right
hand side shows the two types of collateral accepted by the central bank: liquid assets Gt and
asset-backed securities ABSt. However, if the latter can be used as collateral in repurchase
agreements depends on the decision of the central bank. If ht = 1 the central bank does not
accept asset-backed securities.11 The lower the haircut, the lower the discount of those risky
securities applied by the central bank and hence the higher the volume of liquidity obtainable per
unit of asset-backed securities.
1.2.7 Central Bank
A central bank sets the monetary policy rate Rt in response to deviations of output and expected
inﬂation. Moreover, we allow for interest rate smoothing on part of the central bank.
Rt = rRt 1 + (t+1    ) + y(Y    Y ) + d(St    S)
R
t (1.25)
In addition, we assume that the central bank is interested in ﬁnancial market stability and es-
pecially in a liquid interbank market. In this context the central bank decides which assets are
eligible as collateral in repurchase agreements and through this device it is able to vary the liq-
uidity supply to the banking sector directly.
The haircut ht set by the central bank is speciﬁed by the following process
ht = hht 1 + c(St    S)   "
h
t (1.26)
11 This would be the case of the Fed before the crisis. In Europe the haircut was lower than one even before the
crisis and were lowered even more during the crisis.
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If the central bank decreases the haircut ht, the liquidity supply increases. The parameter c
determines the sensitivity of the central bank to asset price deviations from its fundamental value
 S =  Q. Hence, if the market price of capital St is below its steady-state, the central bank will
decrease the haircut in case of c > 0.
We do not postulate that the haircut rule should substitute the interest rate rule. The haircut rule,
however, issuitedtoﬁne-tunetheliquiditysituationontheinterbankmarketoncetheinterestrule
policy does not have the desired effect anymore because for example of the zero lower bound.
We can show that a decrease in the haircut can stimulate both the interbank market and the real
economy.
The proﬁt function of the central bank is as follows

cb
t =
Rt 1
t
M
cb
t 1  
RDF
t 1
t
Xt 1: (1.27)
The objective function corresponds to the proﬁt that the central bank makes with seigniorage
minus the payment on excess reserves a commercial bank k holds in its account with the central
bank. Also the proﬁts of the central bank go the household.
1.2.8 Aggregate Conditions
In equilibrium the following aggregate conditions have to hold.
The amount borrowed by an entrepreneur across commercial bank j has to equal the amount of
loans granted to the entrepreneur by the commercial bank sector. 
X denotes the relative mass
of agent X.
Bt = 

jBt(j) (1.28)
The same holds true for the savings of households and deposits accepted by commercial banks


jDt(j) = 

PDt(h) (1.29)
Total interbank lending has to satisfy


jIBt(j) = 

kIBt(k) (1.30)
Money provided by the central bank has to equal the total money demand by commercial banks
k.
M
CB
t = 

kM
k
t (k) (1.31)
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The total supply of asset-backed securities is constrained by the available capital stock K and
the market price of capital S.
ABSt = StKt (1.32)
The maximum amount of collateral the commercial banks j can offer to commercial banks k is
then given by (1.32). Summing across the demand for collateral by commercial banks k and the
supply of collateral by commercial banks j the following condition holds
ABSt = 

kABSt(k) = 

jABSt(j) (1.33)
Finally, goods market clearing requires
Yt = Ct + C
e
t + Qt
 
K
h
t   (1   )K
h
t 1

+ Gt + Adj. costs (1.34)
1.3 Calibration
One crucial task of calibrating this model is to deal both with a real sector where one period
usually corresponds to one quarter as macroeconomic aggregates like GDP are updated on a
quarterly basis and a ﬁnancial sector where information about ﬁnancial variables are updated
at a much higher frequency. Hence, we decide to calibrate the model to monthly data12. So
most of the parameters on which the literature agreed on and that are calibrated to quarterly data
are adjusted to a monthly frequency. Hence, the discount rate of households  is set to 0:997
which corresponds to a yearly interest rate of 3:6%, which is in line with other studies which
assume 4% per year. For the instantaneous household utility we assume log preferences in both
consumption and labor. The fraction of capital employed in the production process  is set to
0:33 which is a value commonly found in the literature. With respect to the rate of depreciation
that is commonly calibrated to be 10% per year, we set the monthly depreciation rate to a value of
0:8%. The coefﬁcient determining the mark-up p is time-invariant and set to 6 as, for example,
in Bernanke et al. (1999). However, the fraction of retailers being able to set prices each period
is set slightly lower than in the quarterly speciﬁcation. In a quarterly setting it is usually assumed
(as in Bernanke et al. (1999)) that (1   p) is equal to 0:25. In our context we set this value
to 0:15 to account for the monthly frequency. Both the elasticities of the demand functions for
entrepreneurial loans and household deposits and the adjustment cost parameters for both interest
12 This approach is also often used in the macro-ﬁnance literature, see for example Borgy, Mesonnier, Laubach, and
Renne (2011)
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rates are taken from Gerali et al. (2009) and are multiplied by three as the values used in Gerali
et al. (2009) are calibrated to a quarterly model. Thus, the values are 852 and 759 for the deposit
and loan demand elasticities, respectively, and 540 and 1125 for the adjustment cost parameter
d and b, respectively.
The ﬁnancial friction parameter   which is calibrated by Bernanke et al. (1999) to be 0:05 is
recalibrated with our parameters from above and equals 0:0506. Two parameters are important
for the development of the bubble process, a and b. Those are exactly set as in Bernanke and
Gertler (1999), to 0:98 and 0:97216 (which equals a(1 )). The amount of entrepreneurial labor
is chosen to be 0:01 as is common in the literature, see Bernanke et al. (1999). The elasticity of
Tobin’s q with respect to investment is set to 0:5 as in Bernanke and Gertler (2001). The leverage
of the entrepreneurs is assumed to be 2. Finally, in line with Bernanke and Gertler (1999) the
survival rate of entrepreneurs is set to 0.95.
The values in the interest rate rule are set in accordance with Taylor (1993). With respect to the
autoregressive parameters in the AR(1) shock processes we increase all values in comparison to
existing studies as those were chosen to match quarterly time series dynamics. Thus, in our study
they take on values in the range from 0:95 in the case of government expenditure to 0:99 in the
case of the haircut and the policy rate set by the central bank.
The one parameter that is completely unknown in the literature is the intensity of interbank loans
or excess reserves in the production function of a commercial bank k denoted by . We set it to
 = 0:9whichseemsreasonableandisinlinewithmostofthebanks’balancesheets. Inaddition,
the robustness checks indicate that the results are robust to higher values for this parameter. The
haircut is set in steady state to be 0:2, as the ECB paid a little more than 80 percent for BBB
ranked assets.
A comprehensive summary of all parameter and imposed steady state values can be found in
Appendix 1.C.
1.4 Results
In this section we discuss the results of the model. In the impulse response analysis conducted
in Section 1.4.1 we discuss how the model developed in Section 1.2 reacts to a set of shocks.
Furthermore, we compare the impulse responses for the same set of shocks both in a model
setup with and without an interbank market. In the case without an interbank market we assume
that the commercial bank k does not exist. As the commercial bank j is then in direct contact
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with the central bank in this case13 no interbank lending occurs in equilibrium and the interbank
rate is identical to the policy rate. This enables us to to study the implications of an interbank
market on the model dynamics. In Section 1.4.2 we answer the question whether in our model
framework central banks should "lean against the wind", that is, if a central bank should react to
asset prices or not. A boom-bust cycle caused by market price ﬂuctuations is simulated following
the procedure laid out in Bernanke and Gertler (1999). Finally, in Section 1.4.3 three different
exit strategies for the central bank are analyzed within the model framework proposed in Section
1.2.
1.4.1 Impulse Response Analysis
In this section we examine the model dynamics in response to four types of shocks: a monetary
policy shock, a shock to the haircut ht applied to risky assets, a shock to technology At and to the
market price of capital St. The impulse responses are expressed in percentage deviations from
steady state and one period corresponds to one month. All corresponding ﬁgures can be found in
Appendix 1.D.1.
Figure 1.2 shows the impulse response functions to an unanticipated 25 bp increase (3% in an-
nualized terms) in the nominal interest rate. As the policy rate rises, liquidity demanded by the
commercial bank k declines and the interest rate for interbank loans increases. This in turn lets
a commercial bank demand less interbank funds. At the same time a higher interest rate induces
the commercial bank k to hold more excess reserves at the central bank. This countercyclical
movement of interbank loans and excess reserves is due to the speciﬁcation of the function as-
sumed for a commercial bank k in splitting up the liquidity obtained from the central bank.14 The
fundamental price of capital Qt decreases on impact and returns gradually to its steady state. The
response of output and inﬂation is in line with many other New-Keynesian studies. Hence, our
model recommends to raise interest rates in response to a boom in asset prices. This is exactly
what should have happened in the US where the policy rate has been kept at a too low level for
too long.
An interbank market smoothes the responses of the economy to a monetary policy shock com-
pared to the case without an interbank market. Taking for example output and inﬂation, the
impulse responses are all qualitatively the same but the initial impact is much more pronounced.
Liquidity decreases more than in the case where an interbank market is not present. Moreover,
13 Even in the model without an interbank market the results will differ from Bernanke and Gertler (1999) due to
the presence of an proﬁt maximizing commercial bank
14 The percentage increase in excess reserves is much higher because its steady state value is very low.
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the decline in the fundamental price of capital and thus the decline in the value of the asset-
backed securities is stronger if the interbank market is shut down.
If the central bank lowers the haircut on asset-backed securities Figure 1.3 shows that the liq-
uidity supply increases on impact and converges slowly back to its steady-state. This is due to
the fact that the autoregressive parameter of the haircut is chosen to be very close to one and
one time period corresponds to one month15. As expected both output and inﬂation increase on
impact in response to a 10% decrease in the haircut applied by the central bank. The lowering
of the haircut has a positive effect on the fundamental price of capital which then increases the
value of the asset-backed securities. As the total value of collateral offered by the commercial
banks in return for interbank loans increases, the interbank lending rate decreases which stim-
ulates interbank lending. Besides rising interbank lending excess reserves go up as well. This
is the only time that both quantities move in the same direction.16 In addition output rises on
impact. This stimulus, however, comes at a cost of higher inﬂation. A comparison between the
model with and without an interbank market is not very meaningful here as the haircut policy
in our setup only works with an interbank market. The assumption hinges on the fact that the
commercial bank k gets liquidity from the central bank in exchange for government bonds and
asset-backed securities. Once the interbank market is eliminated, the haircut policy is ineffective
because a commercial bank j is in direct relation with the central bank to obtain its funding.
In Figure 1.4 technology increases by 1%. As this shock originates in the real sector the re-
sponses of the real variables (output, inﬂation, fundamental price of capital) are in line with
other studies that incorporate a ﬁnancial accelerator (see Bernanke et al. (1999) and Christensen
and Dib (2008)). As the technology shock leads to a decrease in the policy rate, the interbank
lending rate decreases as well which in turn stimulates interbank lending activity. In the case
of a technology shock the two setups deliver similar responses for output and consumption. If
the interbank market is missing the price of capital and therefore the asset-backed securities are
deviating a bit more from their respective steady states. The same holds true for liquidity. If any-
thing, then a shock to technology is dampened by the presence of the interbank market, although
not by as much as in the case of a monetary policy shock.
Finally we analyze a shock which leads to a 10% increase in the market price St.17 In this case,
for the ﬁrst time, the impulse responses of market price and fundamental price are not identical
(see Figure 1.5). While both prices increase, the market value rises ten times as much, driving up
15 In a period of forty months liquidity as well as the other persistent ﬁnancial variables converge back to their steady
states
16 Compare on the real side the increase of both labor and capital after a technology shock using the same production
function speciﬁcation.
17 The deviation of the fundamental value Qt from the market price St is denoted by ut
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the value of the asset-backed securities above their fundamental value as their value depends on
the market price St. Although the liquidity supply by the central bank rises with the value of the
asset backed securities, banks are reluctant to increase their interbank lending and rather invest
in riskless excess reserves. Hence, in our model banks become more cautious in their investment
behavior in response to sharp increases in asset prices. Although the increase in the value of
the asset-backed securities results from a shock to the market price and not from an increase in
the liquidity supplied by the central bank, the model resembles the behavior of the banks in the
aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis. Namely, that in response to an increase in liquidity banks are
reluctant to lend in the interbank market and rather invest in risk-free assets. A shock to the mar-
ket price St exhibits a signiﬁcantly different evolution of variables. Without an interbank market
the size of the market price increase is only about a third compared to its impact in the setup
that features an interbank market. Asset-backed securities and liquidity show similar responses
across model speciﬁcations. Having only a minuscule but negative effect on the interest rates,
the real sector develops a life on its own and behaves counterintuitive if no interbank market is
considered. The fundamental value goes down as investment decreases after a slight interest rate
decrease. Output and consumption react in the same way. Inﬂation is increasing but only by
very little. After all and despite some counterintuitive results the volatility is nevertheless greatly
reduced once the interbank market is eliminated. In this case the interbank market ampliﬁes
shocks to the market price of capital St.
1.4.2 Boom-Bust Cycle
In this subsection we apply the methodology of Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Bernanke and
Gertler (2001) to a model framework with a micro-founded interbank market and where the
central bank has an additional central bank instrument, namely, the haircut rule given in equation
(1.25). The question we try to answer is whether central banks should ‘lean against the wind’,
that is, if a central bank should respond to deviations of asset prices from their fundamental value.
We plot six variables18: Output and inﬂation to analyze the impact on macroeconomic volatility,
interest rate spread and excess reserves to consider ﬁnancial markets and the fundamental and
the market price of capital.
In this subsection we compare eight different cases which are speciﬁed in Table 1.3. These
cases differ in the central bank’s reaction to output deviations, inﬂation deviations and asset
price deviations when deciding about the setting of its policy instruments. Compared to case
18 Bernanke and Gertler (1999) also plot only six variables: output, inﬂation, the market price of capital, the funda-
mental price of capital, the return on capital and the external ﬁnance premium
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1 in case 2 the central bank reacts much more aggressive to inﬂation rate deviations. Cases 3
and 4 are identical to case 1 and case 2, respectively but this time asset price deviations let the
central bank adjust its policy rate. The coefﬁcients for deviations of output and inﬂation from
their respective steady-state values are identical in cases 5 to 8. Moreover, in case 6 and 8 the
the central bank reacts to asset price deviations by adjusting its policy rate. However, in cases 7
and 8 the central bank adjusts the haircut applied to the set of eligible assets if the market price
of capital St deviates from the fundamental value of capital Qt.
Cases Values Cases Values
 y c d  y c d
Case 1 1.01 0 0 0 Case 5 1.01 0.5 0 0
Case 2 2 0 0 0 Case 6 1.01 0.5 0 0.1
Case 3 1.01 0 0 0.1 Case 7 1.01 0.5 0.5 0
Case 4 2 0 0 0.1 Case 8 1.01 0.5 0.5 0.1
Table 1.3: Boom-Bust Cycle Analysis: Cases
Figure 1.6 resembles the analysis of Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Bernanke and Gertler
(2001) within our model setup and compares accomodative and aggressive monetary policy ei-
ther without (cases 1 & 2) or with (cases 3 & 4) the central bank reacting to deviations of asset
prices. In this case the haircut rule is a simple AR(1) process that does not react to asset prices.
To assess the quantitative importance of the stability gains we calculate the variances for each of
the six variables shown in Figure 1.6.
Output Inﬂation Fundamental Price Q Market Price S Spread Excess Reserves
Case 1 0.0102 0.012 0.0622 0.1226 0.1537 13.7149
Case 2 0.0047 0.0038 0.0252 0.0675 0.1494 16.1308
Case 3 0.0101 0.0071 0.065 0.127 0.1606 14.988
Case 4 0.0048 0.0027 0.0284 0.073 0.1549 16.8067
Table 1.4: Stabilization Gains I
The results for cases 1 and 2 resemble the results in Bernanke and Gertler (1999), namely, that a
higher response coefﬁcient on inﬂation dampens both output and inﬂation. Cases 3 and 4 deliver
similar results compared to the cases without the central bank reacting to asset price movements.
As expected the prices for capital are less diverging from the steady state once the interest rate
rule incorporates a response to asset price deviations. In its decision to react to asset price move-
ments or not, the central bank faces a trade-off. Setting d > 0 allows a central bank to better
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stabilize inﬂation and output but at the cost of more volatility in the ﬁnancial variables. Hence,
according to this model it is the weight put on ﬁnancial market stability relative to output and
inﬂation stabilization that is important in the decision of incorporating asset prices in the interest
rate rule or not. This is different from the position of Bernanke and Gertler (1999) who claim
that the interest rate should not respond to asset price deviations.
In Figure 1.7 we come to the core of the debate between Bernanke and Gertler (2001) and Cec-
chetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani (2002). The latter argue that once the interest rate rule contains a
non-zero response coefﬁcient to output as well the argumentation of Bernanke and Gertler (1999)
no longer holds. If this is true a central bank which reacts to deviations of output and asset prices
(case 6) should be more successful in stabilizing the macroeconomic variables than a central
bank which does not respond to asset prices at all (case 5). To assess the quantitative importance
of the stability gains we calculate the variances for each of the six variables shown in Figure 1.7.
Output Inﬂation Fundamental Price Q Market Price S Spread Excess Reserves
Case 5 0.01 0.0046 0.0576 0.1167 0.1653 15.7312
Case 6 0.0082 0.0026 0.046 0.0999 0.165 17.0213
Case 7 0.0009 0 0.0022 0.0215 0.0058 3.134
Case 8 0.0007 0 0.0015 0.0191 0.0088 3.7898
Table 1.5: Stabilization Gains II
Based on the results in Table 1.5 which depicts the variances of the variables plotted in Figure
1.7 we can conﬁrm the result of Cecchetti et al. (2002). But the overall performance can be
dramatically improved if the haircut rule is allowed to respond to asset prices either without
(case 7) or with (case 8) the interest rate exhibiting ‘leaning again the wind’-behavior.
Asaresult, ourmodelpredictsthatmacroeconomicstabilityisprimarilyachievedbytheliquidity
management of the haircut rule and not by the the interest rate policy of the central bank.
1.4.3 Exit Strategies
In the aftermath of a crisis exit strategies and primarily the timing of the exit are very important
questions for central banks. We are not able to determine the optimal exit date within our model.
Nevertheless we are able to analyze the response of the economy to an exit. Methodologically
we follow Angeloni, Faia, and Winkler (2010) who examine exit strategies at the government
level in a deterministic environment. However, we perform this exercise in connection with exit
strategies of the monetary authority. In our scenario we examine three cases: (1) the exit from
a haircut policy where risky assets are purchased at lower haircuts than normal and (2) the si-
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multaneous exit from both the above mentioned haircut policy and an interest rate policy that
keeps the interest rate close to its zero lower bound and (3) an exit from a policy that keeps the
loan-to-value ratio at a level above normal.19
In Figure 1.8 we depict four variables and their reactions if the market price is shocked nega-
tively. One path shows how the economy evolves if the central bank can credibly commit not to
exit from its haircut policy (“no exit”). Given a negative shock to the market price, the haircut
rule decreases constantly keeping output stable and inﬂation and the prices of capital close to
their steady state values. Another path exempliﬁes how the variables evolve if agents are sur-
prised by the fact that the central bank ignores deviations of the market price of capital from
period twenty-ﬁve onwards (“unanticipated exit”) and the haircut returns back to its steady-state
value at a pace governed by the AR-coefﬁcient. Obviously until the time of the unanticipated exit
the economy’s response is identical to the “no exit”-case. Afterwards, given that the haircut is
no longer responding to asset price movements, output and inﬂation drop immediately and con-
siderably, as liquidity is reduced sharply. In addition, the prices of capital reduce unexpectedly
before returning gradually to the steady state value. The last path depicted in Figure 1.8 belongs
to a situation where the agents anticipate correctly from the very beginning that after twenty-four
periods the central bank is no longer stimulating the economy with its haircut instrument (“an-
ticipated exit”). Hence, for all variables this path has to differ from period one onwards as the
expectation of the central bank’s reduced liquidity provision drives up output after a few periods
and lets inﬂation fall from the very beginning. Once the haircut rule is actually shut down, the
prices of capital and output experience a sudden but only slight dip before returning fast to their
steady states. Only inﬂation takes longer to adjust. Table 1.6 shows the variances of the four
variables plotted in Figure 1.8. The variances are lowest for the case of a constant haircut. More-
over, the variances are signiﬁcantly lower if the central bank exits its constant haircut policy as
anticipated by the agents in the model.
Output Inﬂation Fundamental Price Q Market Price S
No Exit 0.0039 0.0014 0.0191 0.0335
Anticipated Exit 0.0484 0.0052 0.0552 0.0779
Unanticipated Exit 0.2622 0.0032 1.1972 1.3867
Table 1.6: Exit from Haircut Policy
Figure 1.9 shows the same analysis when the central bank exits its haircut policy after twenty-
19 One could assume that the loan-to-value is controlled by a supervisory authority whose only objective is to keep
excesses on the interbank market at bay. Note that both the haircut rule and the loan-to-value ratio respond to
asset price deviations.
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four periods and simultaneously increases the interest rate to a level implied by the Taylor-rule.
The results are more mixed in this example. For output and inﬂation the anticipated response
is much closer to the unanticipated one. Unlike in the previous case where only an exit to the
haircut rule was examined the response to inﬂation looks much smoother with an initial spike
in the beginning as the interest rate is ﬁxed close to its zero lower bound. Output and also the
price of capital experience more pronounced downturns if the policy rate is held simultaneously
at zero. The conclusion drawn from the variances in Table 1.7 is that less volatility in inﬂation
Output Inﬂation Fundamental Price Q Market Price S
No Exit 8.2629 10.2129 2.8563 3.4686
Anticipated Exit 9.3231 8.5345 4.9132 5.7406
Unanticipated Exit 8.0824 10.7364 10.8665 11.9479
Table 1.7: Exit from Haircut Policy plus Taylor-Rule
comes at the cost of more volatility in the other variables. Again the anticipated exit is preferable
to an unanticipated exit.
Finally, in Figure 1.10 we assume that the central bank is able to control the loan-to-value ratio
and acts as a supervisory authority. The setup is the same as in the previous cases with the in-
strument being shut down after twenty-four periods and letting it return to its steady-state value
at a speed governed by a pure AR(1) process afterwards. In the “no exit”-case the loan-to-value
ratio would be constantly above its steady-state value which leads to very little macroeconomic
volatility as can be seen in Figure 1.10. After a shock to the market price output decreases and
inﬂation increases slightly. In the case of an anticipated exit, the reaction of output and inﬂation
is stronger. After the exit, output as well as the prices for capital increase sharply whereas inﬂa-
tion drops considerably because we assumed that the loan-to-value ratio runs countercyclical to
the development in the asset-backed securities. Once the loan-to-value ratio returns to its normal
level, the value of asset-backed securities increases and overall demand in the real sector drives
up the price of capital and output. If the exit is unanticipated by the agents, output and the price
of capital increase even stronger. This is conﬁrmed by the variances produced by the simulation
and which are depicted in Table 1.8.
Output Inﬂation Fundamental Price Q Market Price S
No Exit 0.0039 0.0014 0.0191 0.0335
Anticipated Exit 0.0442 0.006 0.066 0.0726
Unanticipated Exit 0.0484 0.0045 0.1742 0.1437
Table 1.8: Exit from constant Loan-to-Value Ratio
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1.5 Conclusion
The ﬁnancial crisis has changed the way economists have to think about modeling and explaining
monetary policy. This paper tries to take a step in the right direction by modeling an interbank
sector that is motivated by individually optimal behavior of banks in the presence of an interbank
market. By this modeling device unconventional monetary policy which includes not only a sim-
ple interest rate rule but with the haircut a collateral policy as well can be analyzed. Thereby
not only central bank behavior in the crisis but also an exit strategy that all central banks in the
world are looking for after a recession can be examined. Furthermore we are able to take up the
debate of Bernanke and Gertler against primarily Cecchetti and argue whether it is advisable to
include asset prices in the interest rate rule and contribute to it by analyzing a second monetary
instrument.
We ﬁnd that the interbank market matters for the economy as a whole as it decreases macroe-
conomic volatility if an interest rate shock hits the economy and ampliﬁes it if a shock to asset
prices occurs. Once this market is drying up or risks to be malfunctioning, central banks have
to react and stimulate the liquidity situation on this market by other measures than traditional
interest rate policy. The haircut as an additional instrument is even more important if the policy
rate set by the central bank is already close to the zero lower bound and restricts the leeway of a
central bank. Decreasing haircuts is the instrument we analyzed and it works ﬁne to boost inter-
bank lending and increase output in total. This comes at the risk of increased inﬂation in the ﬁrst
periods after a negative shock to haircuts. With respect to the ongoing debate in the literature
we back the position of Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and claim that asset prices should not be
incorporated in the interest rate rule. In this model framework both ﬁnancial and macroeconomic
volatility is lowest if the haircut responds to asset price deviations. After a negative shock to the
market prices of ﬁnancial assets, central banks could reduce the macroeconomic volatility further
if they commit to exit at a pre-announced date. Agents’ expectations formation contributes then
to a smoothing of key variables.
An interesting way to extend the model would be ﬁrst to implement default probabilities on the
interbank market which certainly would increase the responses in a ﬁnancial crisis setup. Sec-
ondly, having included several types of shocks both in the real as well as in the ﬁnancial sector,
one further possibility would be to estimate the model to match certain country characteristics
more accurately.
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1.B.2 Log-linearized Equations
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1.C Calibrated Parameters
Parameters Values Parameters Values
 0.997 d 852
 0.33 b 759
 0.008 y 6
d 540   0.0506
b 1125  0.95
p 0.85 a 0.98
om 0.01 $ 0.5
 0.9 # 0.9792

p 1 g 0.9

i 1 m 0.9

CoB 1 r 0.99

pd 1 a 0.95

l 1 h 0.98

h 1  1.5
 0.15 y 0.5
b = a  (1   ) 0.9722 c 0
Ass 1 d 0
ss 1 
 0.01
HCss 0.2 Lev 2
LHss 0.25 Gss
Y ss 0.2
CEss
Y ss 0.04
Table 1.9: Calibrated Model Parameters
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1.D Dynamic Analysis
1.D.1 Impulse Response Analysis
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Figure 1.2: Interest Rate Shock
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Figure 1.3: Haircut Shock
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Figure 1.5: Market Price Shock
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1.D.2 Boom-Bust Cycle
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Figure 1.6: Boom-Bust Cycle I
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Figure 1.7: Boom-Bust Cycle II
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1.D.3 Exit Strategy
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Figure 1.8: Exit Strategy: Haircut
361.D Dynamic Analysis
0 100 200 300 400 500
−10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Inflation
time
0 100 200 300 400 500
−5
0
5
10
15
20
25
Output
time
 
 
no exit
anticipated exit
unanticipated exit
0 100 200 300 400 500
−30
−25
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
Fundamental Price
time
0 100 200 300 400 500
−30
−25
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
Market Price
time
Figure 1.9: Exit Strategy: Haircut plus Taylor-Rule
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Figure 1.10: Exit Strategy: Loan-to-Value Ratio
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Interbank Reﬁnancing Conditions and
Bank Risk-taking
2.1 Introduction
It is commonly agreed that the seeds of the ﬁnancial crisis have been sown by the subprime
mortgage crisis sparked by the bursting of the housing price bubble in the United States. At the
time the house prices in the United States plummeted ﬁnancial institutions held large exposures
of mortgage-related securities because they seemed to offer an attractive risk-return proﬁle. As
losses in those securities accumulated in the balance sheets of banks worldwide the trust in the
stability of ﬁnancial institutions began to vanish and reﬁnancing started to become an issue for
banks. Especially as liquidity on the important interbank market where banks with excess liquid-
ity lend to banks with liquidity demand dried up. The persistent reluctance of banks to provide
other banks with liquidity on the interbank market contributed to the ampliﬁcation of the initial
shock that originated in the US housing market.
Interbank markets in economics have been introduced by Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) who
show that an interbank market where banks can borrow and lend liquidity is optimal to cope with
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. This emphasizes the importance of the interbank market for the
liquidity management of banks. Since then the literature on interbank markets has grown con-
siderably. There are models which incorporate an interbank market to examine its role for the
propagation of ﬁnancial shocks (Rochet and Tirole (1996), Allen and Gale (2000)), other models
analyze the role of interbank markets for monetary transmission (Freixas and Jorge (2008b)) and
still other models emphasize the role of central banks for emergency liquidity assistance of banks
in the case of a failure of interbank markets (Rochet and Vives (2004), Repullo (2005), Acharya,
Gromb, and Yorulmazer (2012)).
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This paper focuses on a speciﬁc form of market failure which has been observed in the market
for interbank liquidity since the beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis, namely liquidity hoarding. This
liquidity hoarding on part of banks has been conﬁrmed empirically. For example, Acharya and
Merrouche (2010) study the liquidity demand of banks in the Sterling money market and ﬁnd
that the banks’ liquidity holdings increased by 30% during the subprime crisis in August 2007.
For the Euro area Heider et al. (2009) provide similar evidence of liquidity hoarding in the unse-
cured Euro interbank market in September 2007. Using data on intraday account balances held
by banks at the Federal Reserve and Fedwire interbank transactions Ashcraft et al. (2011) ﬁnd
evidence for precautionary hoarding of reserves in the Federal Funds market between Septem-
ber 2007 and August 2008. Afonso et al. (2011) examine the US federal funds market after the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Their results suggest that banks became more concerned about
counterparty risk. Similar results have been obtained by Taylor and Williams (2009). Hence,
while liquidity hoarding by banks is conﬁrmed by the data, if this behavior is caused by a pre-
cautionary motive or due to counterparty risk is not quite clear.
Like in the empirical literature, in the theoretical literature there exist two explanations why in-
dividual behavior of banks jointly led to disruptions on the interbank market. One strand of the
literature argues that the observed liquidity hoarding by banks is the result of concerns about its
own future liquidity needs. One example is the incomplete markets model by Allen et al. (2009b)
who show that the price volatility due to the lack of hedging completely against aggregate and
idiosyncratic shocks leads to the holding of excess reserves by banks. Hence, banks show pre-
cautionary behavior which can be explained by an internal motive for holding on to their liquidity
and not providing liquidity on the interbank market. In contrast, Freixas and Jorge (2008b) or
Heider et al. (2009) argue that it is rather an external motive, namely, that each bank is concerned
about the balance-sheet conditions of other banks which leads to the tensions on the interbank
market. Freixas and Jorge (2008b) show that interbank market imperfections results in an equi-
librium with credit rationing. And the study of Heider et al. (2009) conﬁrms that asymmetric
information about the counterparty risk can lead to a breakdown of the interbank market.
In this paper a model with a heterogeneous banking sector is developed where some of the banks
possess excess liquidity while others lack sufﬁcient funds to ﬁnance a risky portfolio investment.
The interbank market of the model allows for a transfer of liquidity from banks with a liquidity
surplus to banks with a liquidity deﬁcit. The level of counterparty risk in this model depends
on the quality of the balance sheet and the portfolio choice made by a bank. It is assumed that
the counterparty risk involved in interbank lending is not directly observable. But interbank
lending banks possess a costless technology which allows them to imperfectly assess the quality
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of a bank’s balance sheet. The interbank market functions smoothly if interbank lending banks
are sufﬁciently conﬁdent about their assessment of the counterparty risk involved in providing
liquidity on the interbank market. Moreover, the model implies that if lending banks in the in-
terbank market care about counterparty risk they are able to exert control on the risks taken by
banks. However, it is shown that the liquidity on the interbank market can dry up if the reliability
of the technology of the interbank lending banks falls below a certain threshold. As banks are
then unable to differentiate between high and low counterparty risks they ﬁnd it optimal not to
lend on the interbank market even if their analysis signals that the true counterparty risk is low.
The model developed in this paper is based on Rajan (1994). However, in the model of Rajan
(1994) it is assumed that a bank possesses sufﬁcient own funds to implement the desired policy.
This assumption no longer holds in this model where a bank is required to obtain liquidity on
the interbank market to be able to implement the optimal portfolio decision. Only due to this
extension the impact of the lending policy of banks in the interbank market on the riskiness of
the balance sheet of banks with a liquidity demand cab be analyzed. The paper of Heider et al.
(2009) is closely related to this paper as it examines the effect of counterparty risk on interbank
lending activity. But in their model the counterparty risk is assumed to be totally random. In
contrast, in this model the level of counterparty risk is partially determined endogenously by
the strategic behavior of the interbank borrowing bank. Moreover, the results derived with this
model can be applied to a broader set of economic situations as in contrast to Heider et al. (2009)
it is unnecessary to assume that there is asymmetric information about the riskiness of the invest-
ment and the model framework developed in this chapter can be adapted to both collateralized
and uncollateralized interbank lending. Like Heider et al. (2009) the result of a liquidity policy
of the central bank is examined, however, the results derived in this paper is not conﬁned to the
effect on the level of liquidity supply. In addition, it is commented on the risk involved with
such a liquidity policy, namely, that if a central bank supplies liquidity to a bank independent of
the riskiness of the planned investment, the balance sheet quality can deteriorate further as the
riskiness of the portfolio increases.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 the model framework of the interbank market
and the decision problems of both an interbank lending bank as well as an interbank borrowing
bank is presented. Furthermore an agent referred to as “the analyst” who processes the earnings
report of each interbank borrowing bank is introduced. Like an analyst in the banking industry,
this agent has only access to public available information. Section 2.3 derives the equilibrium
bank behavior on the interbank market. Section 2.4 discusses the model implications for the
risk-taking of interbank borrowing banks and the role of the central bank in this model. Finally
41Chapter 2 Interbank Reﬁnancing Conditions and Bank Risk-taking
section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Model
To analyze the consequences of the risk-taking behavior of a bank on other banks’ willingness to
lend on the interbank market, a partial equilibrium model that builds on the framework of Rajan
(1994) is set up. However, the framework derived in Rajan (1994) does not allow to study the
behavior of banks on the interbank market because he assumes that at any time a bank possesses
sufﬁcient own funds to satisfy its liquidity needs. But the recent ﬁnancial crisis showed that
there are times where the funding liquidity risk of a bank can be substantial and hence the
assumption made in Rajan (1994) is not fulﬁlled. Thus, this assumption is dropped and it is
assumed instead that a bank which suffers a liquidity shortage has to resort to the interbank
market to obtain liquidity. Moreover, the model of Rajan (1994) is generalized to a ﬁnancial
market setting where a bank invests its funds in a risky portfolio.
The timeline in Figure 2.1 provides an overview of the underlying model structure described
in detail in this section. The description above the timeline belongs to banks with a demand
for interbank liquidity, the description below the timeline to banks with a potential supply of
interbank liquidity.
Bank i is randomly matched to a bank n Balance sheet quality q of bank i realizes Earnings report by bank i
) Investment in a risky portfolio Portfolio outcome ! of bank i realizes Bank i faces costs of c if aq = a at d = 1
Bank i decides on portfolio risk policy aq
d=0 d=1 d=2
Bank n is matched to a bank i Bank n decides about lending policy bs Bank n privately learns balance sheet qual-
ity of bank i
Payoff from interbank lending activity re-
alizes
Figure 2.1: Model Timeline
It is assumed that at the beginning of d = 0 each bank is provided with an exogenously given
liquidity endowment of size E > 0. To introduce heterogeneity among banks it is assumed that
at d = 0 some banks are able to invest their endowment E in a risky portfolio X while others
cannot.1 The excess liquidity of a bank which does not have the chance to invest its funds in a
1 The size of the portfolio investment is normalized to one. Hence, the value of the portfolio at any point in time is
equal to its price.
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portfolio at d = 0 is equal to its endowment E. In the following to differentiate between these
two bank types, a bank with an investment opportunity is indexed by i, a bank with no investment
opportunity by n. If an individual bank in the economy independent of its investment opportunity
at d = 0 is referred to, the index m is used.
To motivate borrowing and lending on the interbank market it is assumed that bank i’s endow-
ment Ei is insufﬁcient to ﬁnance the portfolio investment at d = 0, that is, Ei < X. Hence,
bank i has to borrow an amount X   Ei from a bank n on the interbank market. For simplicity
it is assumed that at d = 0 one bank n is randomly matched to one bank i. The simultaneous
interaction of many banks i that have a potential demand for liquidity and many banks n that
have excess liquidity constitutes the interbank market in the model.2 To account for the fact that
the interbank lending market is an over-the-counter market, the lending decision of a bank n at
d = 0 and d = 1 is neither observable by another lending bank j 6= n nor by the analyst.
To abstract from investment decisions by banks i and lending decisions of banks n at d = 0, an
homogenous balance sheet structure at d = 0 is assumed , that is, both banks i and banks n be-
lieve that the portfolio quality across interbank lending banks is identical. Based on the perceived
homogenous quality of portfolios held by banks i, a bank i believes to report positive earnings
at d = 2 with probability one and bank n is sure to earn a gross return of 1 + R on its inter-
bank loan.3 Due to this homogeneity assumption a bank i is always willing to make a portfolio
investment and a bank n will always supply its liquidity on the interbank market at d = 0. This
setup resembles the situation before the breakout of the ﬁnancial crisis. Banks which invested in
mortgage-related securities did not consider to make a loss on this investment. At the same time
banks which lend on the interbank were sure that the proﬁtability of a bank which is invested in
these securities is high enough to be able to repay the interbank loan with probability one.
After having obtained liquidity F0;IB on the interbank market at d = 0, the homogenous balance
sheet of a bank i is given by Table 2.1
2 For a given portfolio investment X there is a negative relationship between the initial endowment Ei and the
liquidity demand F0;IB  X   Ei on the interbank market at d = 0. Although Ei < X is assumed to hold,
it is possible that the interbank liquidity demand F0;IB is smaller than the excess liquidity En of bank n. In
this case bank n invests the remaining excess liquidity En   F0;IB in a liquid, risk-free asset whose return is
normalized to one. As the amount of excess liquidity is exogenous for a bank n, the proceeds from the investment
in the risk-free asset do not affect the optimal decision of bank n at d = 1 and hence will not be considered in its
optimization problem.
3 Let us assume that at d = 0 a bank i got assigned either the portfolio X1
0 or the portfolio X2
0. The assets contained
in either portfolio are traded in an efﬁcient asset market. If in addition the portfolios had the same price X0 at
d = 0, that is, X0 = X1
0 = X2
0 and the projected path of the price of the two portfolios X1 and X2 is identical
over the investment horizon, a rational investor will be indifferent between investing its funds in portfolio X1 or
X2. Moreover, given that at d = 0 a bank i possesses only public information from that same asset market which
demands the same price X0 for the portfolios X1 and X2, a bank i itself is not informed about the quality of the
portfolio X at the time of its initial investment.
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Assets Liabilities
X0 E
F0;IB
Table 2.1: Homogenous Balance Sheet of Bank i at d = 0
At d = 1 new, public available information emerges that casts doubt on the quality of the assets
held by some interbank borrowing banks.4 Hence, as of d = 1 it is common knowledge that the
portfolios held across banks i are not homogenous but form two subsets XL and XH. Let the
low quality portfolio be denoted by XL, the high quality portfolio by XH. The heterogeneous
balance sheet structure at d = 1 is depicted in Table 2.2.
Assets Liabilities
XL
1 E
F0;IB
(a) Low Quality
Assets Liabilities
XH
1 E
F0;IB
(b) High Quality
Table 2.2: Heterogenous Balance Sheet of Bank i at d = 1
These two portfolios differ in their probability to generate a proﬁt for bank i at d = 2. Let q
denote the probability that a bank with a balance sheet quality q encounters a good portfolio
outcome at d = 1. It is assumed that the probability of a good portfolio outcome is positively
correlated to its quality. Hence,
0 < 
L < 
H  1 (2.1)
holds.
2.2.1 Portfolio Risk Decision of an Interbank Borrowing Bank i at
d = 1
At d = 1 a bank i privately observes the portfolio outcome ! 2 
 = fG;Bg.5 Depending on
the portfolio outcome ! a bank i decides on its portfolio risk aq 2 f0;ag.6 While in the case of
aq = 0 the risk of the portfolio held by bank i is constant between d = 1 and d = 2, the portfolio
4 After the portfolio investment at d = 1 by assumption the asset side of the balance sheet of bank i contains only
the risky portfolio X. Hence, the expressions bank, balance sheet and portfolio is used interchangeably when
referring to the quality of a bank i’s asset side.
5 For simplicity it is assumed that the portfolio outcome does not change between d = 1 and d = 2 if the composi-
tion of the portfolio X remains unaltered.
6 The portfolio risk in this model is measured by the variance of the portfolio held by bank i.
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risk increases if it sets aq = a. The reason to set aq = a is to avoid a negative earnings report
at d = 2 which decreases the reputation of bank i in the market. In the following reputation is
deﬁned as the probability that the balance sheet quality q of bank i is considered as high.7
If at d = 1 the outcome of the portfolio is good, that is ! = G, it is assumed that the probability
of a negative earnings report by bank i at d = 2 is equal to zero. Because a bank i is assumed
to be risk neutral, the reputational concerns of bank i in connection with the assumption that
the analyst only differentiates between positive and negative earnings but not between different
levels of positive or negative earnings prevents bank i from increasing the risk of its portfolio by
setting aq = a. Hence, a bank i with a good portfolio outcome at d = 1 will set aq = 0 with
probability one. In contrast, in the case of a bad portfolio outcome ! = B the probability that
bank i is able to report positive earnings at d = 2 is equal to zero if it sets aq = 0. If a bank i
decides to set aq = a instead, it invests in a portfolio Y whose properties will be derived below.
If a bank i is able to report positive instead of negative earnings its expected payoff increases by
an amount b and the gain in its reputation is given by p+   p . The expected costs for a bank
i associated with the policy aq = a are denoted by c. It is assumed that the relationship c > b
holds.8 Hence, a bank i which encounters a bad portfolio outcome ! = B at d = 1 prefers to set
aq = a only if the following condition holds
b   c |{z}
expected return<0
+
reputation>0
z }| {
p
+   p > 0 (2.2)
If a bank i sets aq = a it sells a fraction f of its portfolio X to invest those funds in a portfolio
Y with expected return Y and variance 2
Y.9 If the portfolio outcome of Y is G, the proﬁt PP Y
has to be sufﬁcient to offset the loss of the portfolio X at d = 1 to enable bank i to report positive
earnings at d = 2.10
fPP
Y  LL
X (2.3)
7 As will be shown in Section 2.2.3 the reputation of a bank i is strictly larger if it reports positive earnings.
8 Because of the assumption c > b the policy aq = a will be never optimal if bank i does not care about its
reputation p in the market. Hence, in the following it is assumed that 
 > 0 holds.
9 To abstract from optimal portfolio considerations about the fraction of portfolio X to be sold at d = 1 by bank i
the fraction f is exogenously given.
10 Note that to buy the portfolio Y a bank i is required to sell a fraction f of its portfolio X at d = 1. As a result a
bank i realized a loss of fLLX already at d = 1
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In the model the probability of a good portfolio outcome of portfolio Y is denoted by a. The
following assumption on the size of a is made in this model
0 < a < 
L (2.4)
The lower bound for a is zero which implies that there is at least a small probability that condi-
tional on obtaining an interbank loan the investment in the risky portfolio Y succeeds. The upper
bound is given by the probability L which denotes the probability that a low quality portfolio
encounters a good outcome.
In contrast, if the outcome of the risky portfolio Y at d = 2 is bad, which happens with a proba-
bility of 1 a, the loss of the portfolio investment in Y , LLY, adds to the loss encountered from
holding the portfolio X
(1   f)LL
X + f(LL
X + LL
Y) > LL
X , f LL
Y > 0 (2.5)
The relationship c > b is satisﬁed if the expected loss of an investment in portfolio Y , c 
(1   a)f LLY, is larger than the expected proﬁts b  afPP Y.
The effect of the portfolio decision aq = a on the balance sheet of bank i is illustrated in ﬁgure
2.2.
Assets Liabilities
XB E
Y F0;IB
Assets Liabilities
(1   f)XB E
fY G F0;IB
) pos. earnings
a
Assets Liabilities
(1   f)XB E
fY B F0;IB
) neg. earnings
1   a
Figure 2.2: High Risk Balance Sheet
Thus, because the portfolio decision of a bank i with a good portfolio outcome G is invariant and
equal to aq = 0 it is only a bank i with a bad portfolio outcome at d = 1 which decides about the
portfolio risk aq 2 f0;ag at d = 1.
The objective function maximized by a bank with a bad portfolio outcome ! = B at d = 1 is
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given by
U = (1   
)

 
 
1   a
qI[bs=1]

min[Ei;LLX]   cI[aq=a \ bs=1]
	
+ 
E1p (2.6)
The structure of the objective function (2.6) of bank i is taken from Rajan (1994) and consists
of two parts. The ﬁrst term is the expected discounted payoff of the portfolio X conditional on
a bad portfolio outcome ! = B at d = 1.11 The second term represents the contribution of the
reputation of bank i to the expected value of its objective function. The size of 
 determines
the importance of such reputational concerns for bank i relative to the expected payoff of the
portfolio X.
To take the limited liability on part of bank i into account the term min

Ei;LLX
is introduced
where LLX denotes the loss of bank i suffered from the portfolio investment at d = 0. Indepen-
dent of the portfolio quality q the downside risk of a portfolio measured by LLX is assumed to
be large relative to its upside potential measured by PP X minus the interest rate charged on the
interbank loan F0;IB. Hence, the contribution of PP X   (1 + R)F0;IB to the expected payoff of
the portfolio X is negligible compared to the loss LLX suffered on the portfolio X and hence is
omitted in the formulation of the objective function (2.6).
The objective function of bank i is allowed to be conditional on the provision of interbank liq-
uidity at d = 1 as indicated by the indicator function I[bs=1] to account for the effect of bank n’s
lending decision bs 2 f0;1g on bank i’s risk policy choice aq 2 f0;ag. This is different from
Rajan (1994) where bank i is assumed to be fully self-ﬁnanced and it does not have to consider
the optimizing behavior of a bank n in its policy choice at d = 1. In contrast to Rajan (1994) in
this model it is possible that a bank n does not provide liquidity to bank i at d = 1. In this case
bank i has to sell its portfolio at a ﬁre-sale price  to obtain the required liquidity and reports
negative earnings with probability one at d = 2.
Although in Rajan (1994) the parameters c and b have an interpretation, their size is not deter-
mined by the assumptions made therein.12 In contrast, the advantage of relating the risk policy
aq = a to the decision of a bank i to invest in a risky portfolio Y is that the expected costs and
beneﬁts of such a policy can be expressed in terms of changes in the portfolio return and the
portfolio variance. In the following the assumptions on the expected return and the variance of a
portfolio Y to satisfy the assumptions made in connection with the risk policy aq = a are derived.
As the relationship c > b holds by assumption, the overall expected return of the two portfolios
X and Y at d = 2, XY , is required to be lower than the expected return on the portfolio X
11 For simplicity a discount rate of zero is assumed.
12 In Rajan (1994) the relationship b=a holds as the loss has been normalized to one.
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alone. This is satisﬁed only if the expected return of the portfolio Y is lower than the expected
return on the portfolio X, that is,
XY  (1   f)X + fY < X , Y < X (2.7)
At the same time the portfolio variance of the combined portfolio denoted by 2
XY is required
to be larger than the variance of the portfolio X because there is a non-zero probability that the
positive return on the portfolio Y is sufﬁciently high to offset the negative return of the portfolio
X. As a consequence the following relationship holds13

2
XY  (1   f)
2
X + f
2
Y > 
2
X , 
2
Y > 
2
X (2.8)
2.2.2 Lending Decision of an Interbank Lending Bank n at d = 1
The payoff from interbank lending which realizes at d = 2 depends on the true balance sheet
quality q 2 Q = fL;Hg and the risk policy aq 2 f0;ag of bank i. However, neither the quality
of bank i nor its risk policy is observable at d = 1 when bank n has to make its interbank lending
decision.14 Although a bank n cannot observe the balance sheet quality of bank i, it has prior
information on the distribution of the balance sheet quality q among the population. Let the
common prior that the balance sheet quality of bank i is high be denoted by p = P(q = H). It
is assumed that a bank n and the analyst hold the belief that both good and bad balance sheet
qualities exist in the economy. This implies the following restrictions on the common prior p
0 < p < 1 (2.9)
Unlike the analyst, a bank n cannot use the earnings announcement of bank i itself to update
its prior belief p as it has to decide on its lending policy before bank i’s earnings report takes
place. However, for a given conjecture about bank i’s behavior at d = 1, a bank n is able to
form expectations about the posterior of p. In addition, based on the idea forwarded by Broecker
(1990) a bank n is assumed to perform a ﬁnancial analysis to assess a bank’s ability to repay
a loan. The ﬁnancial analysis relies only on public information about the fundamentals of a
potential borrower available at the time when bank n has to make its lending decision. A source
of public available information are the past quarterly and annual reports published by bank i.
13 For simplicity it is assumed that the correlation between the two portfolios is zero.
14 The unobservability of the balance sheet quality q is allowed to be permanent because the quality of the balance
sheet remains private knowledge of bank i.
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The resulting signal s 2 S = fl;hg of such a ﬁnancial analysis is positively but imperfectly
correlated with the true type of bank i. The probability of correctly identifying a bank i of type
H as type H is deﬁned by r = P(hjH) < 1 where uppercase letters denote the true borrower
type and lowercase letters identify the type assigned to a bank i by the test. The probability that
the test identiﬁes a low ability bank i to be of type H is denoted by w := P(hjL) > 0. Given the
signal h from its creditworthiness test and forming expectations about the posterior distribution
of the reputation p of bank i, E1p, a bank n is able to update the probability that bank i is of type
H using Bayes’ formula
P(Hjh)  '
h(a
H;a
L;bs) =
rE1p(aH;aL;bs)
rE1p(aH;aH;bs) + w(1   E1p(aH;aL;bs))
(2.10)
As of d = 1 the expected payoff from lending on the interbank market is computed from the
posterior probability 'q and the expected payoff of a portfolio with quality q owned by a bank
i whose conjectured risk policy is aq. To be able to differentiate between the interbank lending
rate R and the return from lending to a bank i whose risk policy is aq and whose true balance
sheet quality is q, the latter return will be denoted by RR(aq).
V
1;h  V (a
L;a
H;s = h;bs = 1)
= ' RR(a
H;H) + (1   ')RR(a
L;L)
= '


H(1 + R)F0;IB + (1   
H)(a
H = 0)

I[aH=0]
+ '


H(1 + R)F0;IB + (1   
H)

a(1 + R)F0;IB + (1   a)(a
H = a)
	
I[aH=a]
+ (1   ')


L(1 + R)F0;IB + (1   
L)(a
L = 0)

I[aL=0]
+ (1   ')


L(1 + R)F0;IB + (1   
L)

a(1 + R)F0;IB + (1   a)(a
L = a)
	
I[aL=a]
(2.11)
The parameter (aq) denotes the long run recovery value of the portfolio of bank i which sets
aq at d = 1.15 Irrespective of the risk policy aq 2 f0;ag set at d = 1 a portfolio of quality
q = H is expected to have a higher long run recovery value than a portfolio of quality q = L.
Moreover, the recovery value will be strictly higher if bank i sets aq = 0. Equation (2.12) depicts
15 Due to the assumption that a bank n will sell the portfolio as soon as its price is high enough to ensure full
repayment of the interbank loan F0;IB it is inconsequential if a bank n continues to rollover the interbank loan to
bank i beyond d = 2 or if it takes over the assets of bank i at d = 2 in the case of collateralized borrowing on the
interbank market.
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the relationship
(a
H = 0) = F0;IB > (a
L = 0) > (a
H = a) > (a
L = a) (2.12)
Moreover, it is assumed that the payoff of bank n is strictly smaller if bank i sets aq = a instead
of aq = 0.
V (0;0;s = h;bs = 1) > V (a;a;s = h;bs = 1) (2.13)
For that condition to hold it is assumed that the following assumptions on (aH = 0) and (aL =
0) are satisﬁed
(a
H = 0) >

a(1 + R)F0;IB + (1   a)(a
H = a)

(2.14)
(a
L = 0) >

a(1 + R)F0;IB + (1   a)(a
L = a)

(2.15)
It is assumed that the ﬁnancial analysis of a bank n is as reliable in identifying a high quality
balance sheet q = H as it is in identifying a low quality balance sheet q = L, that is,
r = P(hjH) = P(ljL) w = P(hjL) = P(ljH) (2.16)
Hence, having observed the signal s = l, the posterior probability that a bank i is of type L is
given by
P(Ljl)  '
l(a
H;a
L;bs) =
r
 
1   E1p(aH;aL)

r(1   E1p(aH;aL)) + wE1p(aH;aL;bs)
(2.17)
and the expected payoff from lending on the interbank market is given by
V
1;l  V (a
L;a
H;s = l;bs = 1)
= ' RR(a
L;L) + (1   ')RR(a
L;L)
= '


L(1 + R)F0;IB + (1   
L)(a
L = 0)

I[aL=0]
+ '


L(1 + R)F0;IB + (1   
L)

a(1 + R)F0;IB + (1   a)(a
L = a)
	
I[aL=a]
+ (1   ')


H(1 + R)F0;IB + (1   
H)(a
H = 0)

I[aH=0]
+ (1   ')


H(1 + R)F0;IB + (1   
H)

a(1 + R)F0;IB + (1   a)(a
H = a)
	
I[aH=a]
(2.18)
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Due to the assumptions on the probability of a good portfolio outcome H > H, the parameter
restrictions on (aq) shown in equation (2.12), and the assumptions on the precision of the ﬁ-
nancial analysis of bank n made in equation (2.16), the payoff of a bank n whose signal at d = 1
identiﬁes the balance sheet quality of bank i as high, that is s = h, is strictly larger than the
payoff from lending to a bank i for which the ﬁnancial analysis obtained a signal s = l. Hence,
the relationship
V
1;h > V
1;l (2.19)
holds, which implies that a bank n will always prefer to lend to a bank i for which the ﬁnancial
analysis of bank n generated the signal s = h.
The outside option of a bank n is not to rollover the interbank loan at d = 1 and refrain from the
interbank market in the future. Independent of the true portfolio quality q the proceeds from a
ﬁre sale at d = 1 are . The upper bound for the loss encountered from lending on the interbank
market at d = 0 is denoted by . The value of  is determined by the hedging strategy of bank n
which in turn depends on its risk appetite. Hence, the payoff from not lending on the interbank
market at d = 1 is given by
V
0  V (bs = 0) =    (2.20)
The following properties of the objective function of bank n are derived only for the case of
s = h. The signs of the partial derivatives of the objective function are true if the assumption
made in (2.1),(2.4), and (2.12) hold.16
If ' increases because either the signal-to-noise ratio of bank n’s ﬁnancial analysis improves or
the expectations about the posterior distribution of p, E1p, increases, the expected payoff from
interbank lending increases if irrespective of the risk policy aq the expected payoff from lending
to a bank i with balance sheet quality q = H is larger then that from lending to a bank i with
balance sheet quality q = L.
@V 1;h
@'
=

(
H   
L)(1 + R)F0;IB + (1   
H)(a
H = 0)   (1   
H)(a
L = 0)

I[aH=aL=0]
+ (1   a)

(
H   
L)(1 + R)F0;IB + (1   
H)(a
H = a)

I[aH=aL=a]
  (1   a)

(1   
L)(a
L = a)

I[aH=aL=a]
> 0 (2.21)
16 To obtain the results for s = l just exchange H by L and change the sign of the derivative.
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The value of the payoff function strictly increases with the interbank lending rate R.
@V 1;h
@R
= '


HF0;IBI[aH=0] +


HF0;IB + (1   
H)aF0;IB

I[aH=a]
	
+ (1   ')


LF0;IBI[aL=0] +


LF0;IB + (1   
L)aF0;IB

I[aL=a]
	
> 0 (2.22)
The partial derivative of V 1;h with respect to q is positive because the payoff from supplying
liquidity on the interbank market increases with the probability that a bank i with a portfolio of
quality q 2 fL;Hg encounters a good portfolio outcome.
@V 1;h
@H = '

(1 + R)F0;IB   (a
H = 0)

I[aH=0]
+ '

(1 + R)F0;IB  

a(1 + R) + (1   a)(a
H = a)
	
I[aH=a] (2.23)
@V 1;h
@L = (1   ')

(1 + R)F0;IB   (a
L = 0)

I[aL=0]
+ (1   ')

(1 + R)F0;IB  

a(1 + R) + (1   a)(a
L = a)
	
I[aL=a]
> 0 (2.24)
The partial derivative of V 1;h with respect to a is positive as an increase in the probability of a
good portfolio outcome of portfolio Y increases the probability that a bank i with a bad portfolio
outcome that sets aq = a at d = 1 is able to report positive earnings and hence repays the
interbank loan F0;IB
@V 1;h
@a
= '(1   
H)

(1 + R)F0;IB   (a
H = a)

I[aH=a]
+ (1   ')(1   
L)

(1 + R)F0;IB   (a
L = a)

I[aL=a]
> 0 (2.25)
Finally, the expected payoff increases if (aH = a), (aL = 0) or (aH = a) increases without
violating condition (2.12)
@V 1;h
@(aH = a)
= '(1   
H)(1   a)I[aH=a] > 0 (2.26)
@V 1;h
@(aL = 0)
= (1   ')(1   
L)(1   a)I[aL=0] > 0 (2.27)
@V 1;h
@(aL = a)
= (1   ')(1   
L)(1   a)I[aL=a] > 0 (2.28)
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2.2.3 The Analyst
The agent referred to as the analyst processes the earnings information provided by each bank
i at d = 2.17 Like a bank n the analyst can neither observe the quality q 2 fL;Hg of bank i
nor its risk policy aq 2 f0;ag of bank i. In addition, to account for the fact that the interbank
lending market is an over-the-counter market it is assumed that the lending decision of a bank
n is unobserved by the analyst. However, for a given conjecture about the portfolio decision aq
of bank i and about the lending decision bs of bank n at d = 1 in connection with the earnings
report of bank i at d = 2 the analyst is nevertheless able to compute the posterior ppost 2 fp+;p g
using Bayesian updating.18
If at d = 2 the earnings report e of bank i is positive, the analyst is able to infer that bank n
lent to bank i at d = 1. However, it still has to conjecture the risk policy aq;c 2 f0;ag of bank i
because a positive earnings report can be the result of a good portfolio outcome G at d = 1, that
is, bank i set aq = 0 or the result of a bad portfolio outcome B in connection with the portfolio
decision aq = a. Hence, conditional on the conjecture aq;c 2 f0;ag and bs = 1, the reputation
of a bank i after a positive earnings report at d = 2 is given by
p
+(a
H;a
L;bs) = P(Hje > 0;a
H;a
L;bs = 1)
=
P(e > 0jH;aH;aL;bs = 1)P(H)
P(e > 0jH;aH;aL;bs = 1)P(H) + P(e > 0jL;aH;aL;bs = 1)P(L)
=

H + (1   H)aH
p
[H + (1   H)aH]p + [L + (1   L)aL](1   p)
(2.29)
If a bank i reports negative earnings at d = 2, the analyst has to have conjectures on both the
portfolio decision of bank i as wellas thelending policyof bank n becausethere are threereasons
why bank i has to report negative earnings at d = 2. First, bank i encountered a bad portfolio
outcome and bank n supplied liquidity on the interbank market but bank i set aq = 0. Second,
bank i encountered a bad portfolio outcome and set aq = a but bank n refused to supply liquidity
on the interbank market. Third, bank i set aq = a and bank n supplied liquidity on the interbank
market but the outcome of the portfolio Y at d = 2 is bad. Hence, if at d = 2 the earnings
17 At this point it is abstracted from strategic interactions in the investment decision of banks i by assuming that the
earnings information provided by a bank i at d = 2 does not contain any valuable information to update the prior
on the balance sheet quality of bank j 6= i.
18 As the balance sheet quality q is not directly observable but the analyst updates its belief about the balance sheet
quality q after learning about the earnings of a bank i at d = 2, the deﬁnition of reputation in this model follows
Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982).
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report e of bank i is negative and the analyst conjectures that bank i’s portfolio policy is given
by aq 2 f0;ag and a bank n is following lending policy bs 2 f0;1g, the reputation of a bank i is
p
 (a
H;a
L;bs) = P(Hje < 0;a
H;a
L;bs)
=
P(e < 0jH;aH;aLbs)P(H)
P(e < 0jH;aH;aLbs)P(H) + P(e < 0jL;aH;aL;bs)P(L)
=
(1   H)(1   aH)pI[bs=1] + pI[bs=0]
(1   H)(1   aH)pI[bs=1] + pI[bs=0] + (1   L)(1   aL)(1   p)I[bs=1] + (1   p)I[bs=0]
(2.30)
If a bank n refuses to lend to a bank i, that is bs = 0, a bank i reports negative earnings with
probability one independent of the true portfolio quality at d = 1 and (2.30) shows that the
posterior probability p (aH;aL;0) is equal to its prior p. Hence a reduction of the interbank
lending activity by bank n at d = 1 has an adverse effect on the information conveyed in the
earnings signal of a bank i at d = 2.
p
 (a
H;a
L;0) = p (2.31)
The equivalence of the prior and the posterior belief about the balance sheet quality of a bank
i in the case of no interbank lending at d = 1 is especially fatal if due to an external shock the
prior p about the fraction of banks with a good portfolio quality declines.
In the following derivations it is made use of the invariance property of the policy decision of a
bank i given in (2.32).
a
H = a
L (2.32)
This relationship states that conditional on a bad portfolio outcome at d = 1, the policy decision
aq of a bank i is independent of the balance sheet quality q. The reason for this is that the
objective function of bank i (2.6) is independent of the portfolio quality q and thus the incentive
compatibility constraints used to determine the equilibrium behavior of bank i as well.
The following results conﬁrm the ﬁndings in Rajan (1994), however, in the present model the
reputation is sensitive to the willingness of bank n to provide liquidity on the interbank market
at d = 1.
Given that bank n provides liquidity to bank i at d = 1 and (2.1), (2.4), and (2.9) hold, the
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reputation of bank i after a positive earnings report is larger if the conjecture is aq;c = 0
p
+(0;0;1) > p
+(a;a;1)
)
Hp
Hp + L(1   p)
>

H + (1   H)a

p
[H + (1   H)a]p + [L + (1   L)a](1   p)
, 
Hp(1   p)


L + (1   
L)a

> 0 (2.33)
In contrast, after a negative earnings report the conjecture aq;c does not inﬂuence the reputation
of a bank i which received liquidity on the interbank market at d = 1
p
 (0;0;1) = p
 (a;a;1)
)
(1   H)p
(1   H)p + (1   L)(1   p)
=
(1   H)(1   a)p
(1   H)(1   a)p + (1   L)(1   a)(1   p)
,
(1   H)p
(1   H)p + (1   L)(1   p)
=
1   a
1   a
(1   H)p
(1   H)p + (1   L)(1   p)
(2.34)
Due to the assumptions made in (2.1) and (2.9) and using the result in (2.34), one can show that
the reputation of a bank i which reports negative earnings if a bank n does not supply liquidity
on the interbank market is higher compared to a negative earnings report if bank n rolls over the
interbank loan at d = 1. The reason for this result is that even a bank i with a good portfolio
outcome G at d = 1 has to report negative earnings if a bank n sets bs = 0 at d = 1.
p
 (0;0;0) > p
 (a;a;1)
) p >
(1   H)p
(1   H)p + (1   L)(1   p)
, p(1   p)(
H   
L) > 0 (2.35)
Given the relationships (2.33) and (2.34) one can show that the reputation of a bank i after a
positive earnings report is strictly larger than the reputation after a negative earnings report if
(2.1) holds
p
+(a;a;1) > p
 (0;0;1)
)

H + (1   H)a

p
[H + (1   H)a]p + [L + (1   L)a](1   p)
>
(1   H)p
(1   H)p + (1   L)(1   p)
,
H
1   H >
L
1   L (2.36)
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2.3 Equilibrium Bank Behavior
Table 2.3 summarizes each of the agents possible actions, which information each of them has
and which actions each one has to guess when deciding about its own actions.
Bank i Bank n Analyst
Information Portfolio Quality q 2 fL;Hg - -
Portfolio Outcome ! 2 fG;Bg - -
Guess Lending Policy bs Portfolio Risk Decision aq Portfolio Risk Decision aq
Lending Policy bs
Actions Portfolio Risk Decision Lending Policy
aq 2 f0;ag bs 2 f0;1g -
Table 2.3: Agents’ Information Sets and Actions
At d = 1 a bank i is the only agent in the model that has perfect information about its own
portfolio quality q 2 Q = fL;Hg and the portfolio outcome ! 2 
 = fG;Bg when making
its portfolio decision aq 2 f0;ag. Both a bank n and the analyst have only information about
the distributions of q and ! and hence need to guess the equilibrium risk policy of a bank i. In
addition, the analyst cannot observe the lending policy decision of a bank n as the interbank
market is an over-the-counter market and thus it has to guess the equilibrium lending policy of
bank n as well. To illustrate the interaction among the agents in the process of guessing an
equilibrium strategy, the graph below shows the considerations that each of those agents has to
incorporate in that process. A bank i decides on its risk policy aq conditional on the conjecture
about the lending policy of a bank n at d = 1 denoted by bsci. Bank n at d = 1 needs to guess an
equilibrium strategy for the risk policy of bank i denoted by aq;cn conditional on its own lending
policy bs 2 f0;1g at d = 1. Likewise does the analyst conjecture the equilibrium behavior of a
bank i denoted by aq;cp conditional on the conjecture bscp. An equilibrium of the model exists if
1. conditional on the lending policy of bank n at d = 1, the conjectures of bank n and the
analyst about the risk policy of bank i coincide, that is, aq;cnjbs = aq;cpjbs = aq;cjbs
2. conditional on the lending policy of bank n at d = 1, the conjecture aq;cjbs is in line with
the actual risk policy of bank i, that is, aqjbs = aq;cjbs
3. conditional on the risk policy of bank i at d = 1, the conjectures of bank i and the analyst
about the lending policy of bank n coincide, that is, bscijaq = bscpjaq = bscjaq
4. conditional on the risk policy of bank i at d = 1, the conjecture bscjaq is in line with the
actual lending policy of bank n, that is, bsjaq = bscjaq
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Bank i
Bank n Analyst
Guess r.p.
l.p.
Reputation p(a q ;bs)
Guess r.p. and l.p.
Guess r.p. (Coordination)
Guess l.p.
Figure 2.3: Equilibrium Interrelationships
To ﬁnd the model equilibrium in the following the optimal risk policy aq of bank i conditional on
a conjectured lending policy of bank n is derived. In a second step the conditions under which
the conjectured lending policy of bank n satisﬁes the incentive compatibility constraint of bank
n are checked. Because the objective function of bank i given in (2.6) is independent of the
quality of the portfolio held by bank i, the incentive compatibility constraints used to derive the
optimal portfolio decision of bank i are independent of the portfolio quality q as well. Hence,
the derivation of the equilibrium risk policy of bank i will be conﬁned to pooling equilibria and
it is not differentiated between aH and aL but will use only the term aq to refer to the risk policy
of a bank i. Moreover, as noted in section 2.2.3 the earnings information provided by a bank
i at d = 2 does not contain any valuable information to update the prior on the balance sheet
quality of bank j 6= i. In the following the analyst and bank n are referred to as ﬁnancial market
participants. In addition, to simplify notation the size of the interbank loan is set to one, that is,
F0;IB = 1.
To derive the equilibrium risk policy of bank i and the equilibrium lending policy of bank n
one has to set up the incentive compatibility constraints obtained from equation (2.6), (2.11) and
(2.18), respectively.
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2.3.1 Interbank Lending Equilibrium I
If bank i conditional on observing a negative portfolio outcome B and conditional on its guess
bsc = 1 about bank n’s lending policy at d = 1 decides to set aq = a the following incentive
compatibility constraint has to hold
(1   
)[ (1   a)min[Ei;LLX]   c] + 


ap
+(a;a;1) + (1   a)p
 (a;a;)


(1   
)( 1) + 
p
 (a;a;1) (2.37)
where the reputational terms p+(a;a;1) and p (a;a;1) are given by
p
+(a;a;1) =

H + (1   H)a

p
[H + (1   H)a]p + [L + (1   L)a](1   p)
(2.38)
p
 (a;a;1) =
(1   H)(1   a)p
(1   H)(1   a)p + (1   L)(1   a)(1   p)
(2.39)
The left hand side and the right hand side of (2.37) represents the expected payoff of setting
aq = a and aq = 0, respectively, conditional on the ﬁnancial market participants’ conjecture
aq;c = a and conditional on the conjecture bsc = 1 on the lending policy of bank n. To constitute
an equilibrium for bank i the left hand side of (2.37) has to be larger than the right hand side. If
this would not be the case bank i would deviate from the equilibrium strategy conjectured by the
ﬁnancial market participants. Hence, bank i will implement a liberal risk policy aq = a if
c  a

min[Ei;LLX] +


1   

 
p
+(a;a;1)   p
 (a;a;1)

(2.40)
To support such an equilibrium conditional on bank n’s guess that bank i will set aq = a, the
following incentive constraint of bank n has to be satisﬁed
V (a;a;h;1) = '(a;a;1)


H(1 + R) + (1   
H)

a(1 + R) + (1   a)(a
H = a)
	
+ (1   '(a;a;1))


L(1 + R) + (1   
L)

a(1 + R) + (1   a)(a
L = a)
	
  = V (0) (2.41)
where '(a;a;1;) is deﬁned as
'(a;a;1) =
rE1p(a;a;1)
rE1p(a;a;1) + w(1   E1p(a;a;1))
(2.42)
582.3 Equilibrium Bank Behavior
with
E1p(a;a;1) =

p
H + p(1   
H)a + (1   p)
L + (1   p)(1   
L)a

p
+(a;a;1)
+

p(1   
H)(1   a) + (1   p)(1   
L)(1   a)

p
 (a;a;1) (2.43)
The incentive compatibility constraint (2.41) can be rearranged to give a reliability condition as
proposed by Heiner (1983) which links the ability of the individual bank n with the parameters
that deﬁne the economic environment v  fH; L; p; a; (aq)g.
Assume that the following relationship holds
R1(H;v)  
H(1 + R) + (1   
H)

a(1 + R) + (1   a)(a
H = a)

>  (2.44)
R1(L;v)  
L(1 + R) + (1   
L)

a(1 + R) + (1   a)(a
L = a)

<  (2.45)
Given a signal that identiﬁes a balance sheet of bank i as quality q = H, the payoff denoted by
R(H;v) is the expected return from lending to a bank i whose true balance sheet quality is H,
while R(L;v) denotes the expected return from lending to a bank i with balance sheet quality
q = L on the interbank market. The corresponding reliability condition is given by
r
w
>
l1(v)
z }| {
   R1(L;v)
R1(H;v)   
| {z }
g1(v)
1   E1p(a;a;1)
E1p(a;a;1)
,
r
w
>
l1(v)
g1(v)
1   E1p(a;a;1;)
E1p(a;a;1;)
| {z }
E T1(v)
(2.46)
Equation (2.46) shows that a bank n will lend on the interbank market if the actual reliability
r=w of bank n’s creditworthiness test is larger than the minimum required reliability T1(v). The
former can depend on both the ability of a bank n and the economic environment v. However,
due to the assumption that potential interbank lending banks are identical, the actual reliability
r=w is constant. The actual reliability r=w has to increase if the loss from lending to a bank
with a low balance sheet quality increases or the probability of encountering a bank with a low
quality balance sheet in the economy increases. Similarly, the actual reliability r=w is allowed
to decrease if the minimum required reliability T1(v) decreases as either the gain from lending
to a bank of quality q = H increases or the posterior probability that a bank i has a high quality
balance sheet increases.
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2.3.2 Interbank Lending Equilibrium II
If bank i conditional on observing a negative portfolio outcome B and conditional on its guess
bsc = 1 about bank n’s lending policy at d = 1 decides to set aq = 0 the following incentive
compatibility constraint has to hold
(1   
)( 1) + 
p
 (0;0;1) 
(1   
)[ (1   a)min[Ei;LLX]   c] + 


ap
+(0;0;1) + (1   a)p
 (0;0;1)

(2.47)
where the reputational terms p+(0;0;1) and p (0;0;1) are given by
p
+(0;0;1) =
Hp
Hp + L(1   p)
(2.48)
p
 (0;0;1) =
(1   H)p
(1   H)p + (1   L)(1   p)
(2.49)
Hence, bank i will implement a liberal risk policy aq = 0 if
c  a

min[Ei;LLX] +


1   

 
p
+(0;0;1;)   p
 (0;0;1;)


(2.50)
To support such an equilibrium conditional on bank n’s guess that bank i will set aq = a, the
following incentive constraint of bank n has to be satisﬁed
V (0;0;1) = '


H(1 + R) + (1   
H)(a
H = 0)

+ (1   ')


L(1 + R) + (1   
L)(a
L = 0)

  = V (0) (2.51)
where '(0;0;1) is deﬁned as
'(0;0;1;) =
rE1p(0;0;1)
rE1p(0;0;1) + w(1   E1p(0;0;1))
(2.52)
with
E1p(0;0;1;) =

p
H + (1   p)
L
p
+(0;0;1;)
+

p(1   
H) + (1   p)(1   
L)

p
 (0;0;1;) (2.53)
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The incentive compatibility constraint (2.51) can be rearranged to obtain a reliability condition.
Assume that the relationships
R2(H;v)  
H(1 + R) + (1   
H)(a
H = 0) >  (2.54)
and
R2(L;v)  
L(1 + R) + (1   
L)(a
L = 0) <  (2.55)
hold.
Solving (2.51) for r=w results in the following reliability condition
r
w
>
l2(v)
z }| {
   R2(L;v)
R2(H;v)   
| {z }
g2(v)
1   E1p(0;0;1)
E1p(0;0;1)
,
r
w
>
l2(v)
g2(v)
1   E1p(0;0;1)
E1p(0;0;1)
| {z }
E T2(v)
(2.56)
2.3.3 No Interbank Lending Equilibrium
Conditional on observing a negative portfolio outcome B and conditional on its guess bsc = 0
about bank n’s lending policy at d = 1 a bank i has to sell its portfolio irrespective of its portfolio
decision aq 2 f0;ag at d = 1 and reports negative earnings at d = 2 with probability one. The
value of its objective function is then determined by the following relationship
U = (1   
)( 1) + 
p
 (0;0;0) (2.57)
To support an equilibrium where a bank n irrespective of the portfolio decision aq 2 f0;ag does
not supply liquidity on the interbank market at d = 1 the following incentive constraint has to be
satisﬁed
V (0) =  > V (a
q;a
q;s;1) (2.58)
Due to the assumption made in (2.14) and (2.15), V (0;0;h;1) > V (a;a;h;1) holds. Moreover,
due to (2.19), V (0;0;h;1) > V (0;0;l;1). Hence, equation (2.58) becomes
V (0) =  > V (0;0;h;1) (2.59)
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where V (0;0;h;1) is deﬁned in (2.51). If V (0;0;h;1) <  holds and bank n engaged in un-
collateralized lending at d = 0 it strictly prefers not to rollover the loan and executes its option
to sell the debt claim at the strike price  at d = 1. In the case of collateralized lending, bank i
executes the option to sell the debt claim only if the condition  <  holds.
Solving (2.59) for r=w results in the following reliability condition
r
w

l2(v)
z }| {
   R2(L;v)
R2(H;v)   
| {z }
g2(v)
1   E1p(0;0;1)
E1p(0;0;1)
,
r
w

l2(v)
g2(v)
1   E1p(0;0;1;)
E1p(0;0;1;)
| {z }
E T2(v)
(2.60)
2.3.4 Derivation of Equilibrium Regions
After having examined the different equilibria of this model, in the following the thresholds for
the costs c encountered by bank i when setting aq = a as well as the thresholds for the signal-to-
noise-ratio r=w which play an essential role in the lending decision of bank n are deﬁned. These
thresholds will then be used in the identiﬁcation of the equilibrium regions. In Rajan (1994) a
similar exercise is conducted to determine the thresholds for the cost parameter c. However, due
to the lack of an interbank market in Rajan (1994) no thresholds for the signal-to-noise-ratio can
be derived.
Based on the incentive constraints of bank i, (2.40) and (2.50), deﬁne
c
0 = a

min[Ei;LLX] +


1   


p
+(a;a;1)   p
 (a;a;1)

(2.61)
c
00 = a

min[Ei;LLX] +


1   


p
+(0;0;1)   p
 (0;0;1)

(2.62)
To determine the relationship between c0 and c00, it sufﬁces to evaluate the expressions
p+(a;a;1)   p (a;a;1) and p+(0;0;1)   p (0;0;1). From equation (2.34) it is already known
that the condition p (a;a;1) = p (0;0;1) holds. Moreover, in (2.33) it is shown that conditional
on bank n providing interbank liquidity, the reputation of a bank i will be strictly larger in the
case of a low risk policy, that is, p+(0;0;1;)   p+(a;a;1;) > 0 holds. Hence, the following
condition holds
c
00 > c
0 (2.63)
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Thus, conditional on a bank n supplying liquidity on the interbank market, it will be optimal for
bank i to set aq = a if c < c0 holds and aq = 0 if c > c00 holds.19 Similarly, the reliability
conditions (2.46) and (2.56) of bank n are used to deﬁne thresholds for the actual reliability r=w
 r
w
0
=
l1(v)
g1(v)
1   E1p(a;a;1)
E1p(a;a;1)
(2.64)
 r
w
00
=
l2(v)
g2(v)
1   E1p(0;0;1)
E1p(0;0;1)
(2.65)
To determine the relationship between (r=w)0 and (r=w)00, each of the components in (2.64)
and (2.65) are compared across equations. Given (2.15) a comparison of the losses from falsely
lending to a bank with a low balance sheet quality q = L on the interbank market, namely l1(v)
and l2(v), shows that l1(v) > l2(v) holds.
l1(v)     R1(L;v) =    
L(1 + R) + (1   
L)

a(1 + R) + (1   a)(a
L = a)

(2.66)
l2(v)     R2(L;v) =    
L(1 + R) + (1   
L)(a
L = 0) (2.67)
At the same time, due to (2.14) the gain from lending to a bank i of type H increases if a bank i
sets aq = 0 instead of aq = a, that is, g2(v) > g1(v)
g1(v)  R1(H;v)    = 
H(1 + R) + (1   
H)

a(1 + R) + (1   a)(a
H = a)

  
(2.68)
g2(v)  R2(H;v)    = 
H(1 + R) + (1   
H)(a
H = 0)    (2.69)
As a result of equations (2.66)-(2.69) the following relationship holds
l1(v)
g1(v)
>
l2(v)
g2(v)
(2.70)
19 Given the relationship c00 > c0 one can prove that the costs of setting aq = a outweighs its beneﬁts, that is, c0 > b
is true. From (2.33) it is known that p+(a;a;1)   p (a;a;1) > 0 holds. Hence,
c0 = b + a


1   


p+(a;a;1;)   p (a;a;1;)

| {z }
>0
) c0 > b
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To pin down the relationship between (r=w)0 and (r=w)00 one needs to consider the expressions
for the expected reputation of bank i as well. Hence, equations (2.43) and (2.53) are analyzed
next
E1p(a;a;1) =

p
H + p(1   
H)a + (1   p)
L + (1   p)(1   
L)a

p
+(a;a;1)
+

p(1   
H)(1   a) + (1   p)(1   
L)(1   a)

p
 (a;a;1) (2.71)
E1p(0;0;1) =

p
H + (1   p)
L
p
+(0;0;1;)
+

p(1   
H) + (1   p)(1   
L)

p
 (0;0;1;) (2.72)
Evaluating the expressions (2.29) and (2.30) one obtains the following results for E1p(a;a;1)
and E1p(0;0;1)
E1p(a;a;1) = E1p(0;0;1) = p (2.73)
Taking together the results derived in (2.70) and (2.73) it holds true that
 r
w
0
>
 r
w
00
(2.74)
Given the relationships derived in (2.63) and (2.74) and conditional on obtaining a signal s = h
the equilibrium regions of the model are deﬁned as follows
h r
w
i
h
>
 r
w
0
and c  c
0 ) (a
H = a;a
L = a;bs = 1) (I)
h r
w
i
h
>
 r
w
0
and c  c
00 ) (a
H = 0;a
L = 0;bs = 1) (II)
 r
w
0

h r
w
i
h
>
 r
w
00
and c  c
0 ) (a
H = 0;a
H = 0;bs = 1) (III)
 r
w
0

h r
w
i
h
>
 r
w
00
and c  c
00 ) (a
H = 0;a
H = 0;bs = 1) (IV)
h r
w
i
h

 r
w
00
) (a
H = 0;a
L = 0;bs = 0) (V)
The results in (I)-(V) relate the actual signal-to-noise-ratio of a bank n denoted by

r
w

h to the
required signal-to-noise-ratio (r=w)0 and (r=w)00. Case (I) describes the situation where a bank
n lends on the interbank market at d = 1 conditional on bank i implementing the risk policy
aq = a. Conditional on bank i setting aq = 0 a bank n supplies interbank liquidity in case
(II). These are the cases included in Rajan (1994). In case (III) the only way for a bank i to
obtain liquidity on the interbank market at d = 1 is to set aq = 0. While in case (IV) the actual
reliability [r=w] of bank n and the costs c of bank i are such that an interbank lending equilibrium
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where bank i sets aq = 0 is optimal for both counterparties, However, this choice is not optimal
from the point of view of bank i, because from the perspective of a bank i the level of c is low
enough to set aq = a. Finally in case (V) the probability of bank n supplying interbank liquidity
at d = 1 is zero because the actual signal-to-noise-ratio of the ﬁnancial analysis of bank n is so
unreliable that independent of the portfolio decision aq 2 f0;ag of bank i it prefers not to engage
in interbank lending at all. Hence, even if a bank i intends to follow a low risk policy it is denied
an interbank loan at d = 1.
Conditional on the ﬁnancial analysis of bank n generating a signal s = l the expression for 'l
using the result (2.73) is deﬁned as
'
l =
r(1   p)
r(1   p) + wp
(2.75)
Analogously to the incentive compatibility condition of a bank n after a signal s = h, the incen-
tive constraint after observing s = l is given by the following expression
V
1;l = '
lRk(L;v) + (1   '
l)Rk(H;v) >  (2.76)
where the payoff of lending to a bank with balance sheet quality q = L and q = H are deﬁned
by Rk(L;v) and Rk(H;v)  respectively for k 2 f1;2g. Hence, deﬁning lk(v) =  Rk(L;v)
and gk(v) = Rk(H;v)    one obtains the following expression for the reliability condition of a
bank n which received a signal s = l
h r
w
i
l
<
gk(v)
lk(v)
p
1   p
(2.77)
Comparing the expression in (2.77) with (2.46) and (2.56), the relationship between the required
reliability across signals s is given by
h r
w
i
l
= 1=
h r
w
i
h
(2.78)
Hence, if it is assumed that the signal s = h generated by the ﬁnancial analysis of bank n at
d = 1 is informative, that is, [r=w]h > 1, a bank n will only lend to a bank i after receiving a
signal s = l if the signal s = l is uninformative with respect to the balance sheet quality of a bank
i. Thus, by assuming that the signal s is informative irrespective of its value s 2 S = fl;hg the
possibility that a bank n rolls over the interbank loan if the signal s = l is received is excluded
and it is not differentiated between [r=w]h and [r=w]l.
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2.4 Discussion
2.4.1 Bank Risk-taking and Interbank Lending Activity
The equilibrium regions (I)-(V) derived in the previous section prove that there exists a relation-
ship between the unobservable balance sheet risk of a bank i and the uncertainty involved in the
ﬁnancial analysis result of bank n. The lower the signal-to-noise-ratio, the lower is the willing-
ness of a bank n to bear the risk involved in the lending activity to a bank i with an unobservable
balance sheet quality and hence unobservable level of counterparty risk. The signal-to-noise-
ratio increases if for example past ﬁnancial information is no longer a reliable source due to a
structural break in the relationship between variables of interest. If the informativeness of the
ﬁnancial analysis is lower than (r=w)00, a bank n refuses to supply interbank liquidity at all at
d = 1. Hence, the non-provision of interbank liquidity at d = 1 is an optimal response to the
uncertainty of assessing the counterparty risk involved in interbank lending. The model implica-
tions on the relationship between the uncertainty involved in lending and the lending activity are
in line with Flannery (1996) who argues that that a lender loses conﬁdence in its own ability to
assess the creditworthiness of a potential borrower in times where potential lenders expect that
the fundamentals of a counterparty deteriorated.
A potential solution would be to increase the transparency on the risks contained in the bank
balance sheets. In terms of the model an increase in transparency corresponds either to a higher
actual reliability ratio, that is, transparency inﬂuences the left-hand side of the reliability condi-
tion derived from the incentive compatibility constraint of bank n. Or transparency lets interbank
lending banks revise their prior beliefs about the distribution of balance sheet qualities in the in-
terbank market upward which then in turn decreases the required reliability threshold T(v) which
constitutes the right hand side of the reliability condition.
The stress tests conducted by the European Banking Authority (EBA) is an example of a tempo-
rary increase in transparency. For these stress tests the major European banks were required to
disclose certain positions of their balance sheets. Moreover they provided numbers about their
capital adequacy ratio. This information was then used to test the resilience of an individual bank
to several shock scenarios. As Figure 2.4 shows did the EONIA trading volumes increase every
time the EBA published the results of the stress test. The publication dates are marked by the
black vertical lines.20 However, the effect was only temporary. A possible explanation could be
that news which cast doubt on the quality of other asset classes arrived which were not covered in
20 The red vertical line in April 2009 marks the date of a second G-20 summit where political leaders planned to
discuss about the implementation of speciﬁc measures which aim at stabilizing the ﬁnancial system.
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the latest stress test. The results for the equilibrium region (III) and (V) present a second impor-
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Figure 2.4: EONIA Trading Volumes, Source: Bloomberg
tant implication of this model, namely, that a bank n is able to inﬂuence the risk-taking of bank
i, even though the interbank market in this model is characterized by asymmetric information
about the balance sheet quality of interbank borrowing banks. In the equilibrium region (III) it
is optimal for a bank i to set aq = a as the level of the costs related to this portfolio decision is
lower than the threshold c0. However, due to the uncertainty about its own ability to differentiate
between a bank with a low quality balance sheet and a bank with a high quality balance sheet,
bank n is only willing to supply liquidity on the interbank market if in equilibrium a bank i sets
aq = 0. However, in case of r=w < (r=w)00 the uncertainty of bank n about the signal s is so
low that it prefers not to lend to a bank i at all. At the same time if r=w > (r=w)0 a bank n
even supports the high risk policy of a bank i. Hence, the market discipline exercised by inter-
bank lending banks in the interbank market can only complement the efforts of the supervisory
authorities.
2.4.2 Liquidity Policy
To preserve the stability of the ﬁnancial system a central bank has an interest that the banks are
not forced to sell large parts of their asset portfolio at d = 1. Even if the central bank is not
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better informed than any other private bank n in the economy, it has the advantage to be able
to provide sufﬁcient liquidity to all banks i in the economy at the same time. Compared to a
single interbank lending bank n with its restricted amount of liquidity, this is a function that an
individual bank n is unable to fulﬁll. At the same time a central bank can take advantage of the
law of large numbers. Hence, for the same level of risk in the economy, liquidity provision by
the central bank involves signiﬁcantly less risk than for a private bank n.
To analyze the effect of a central bank initiative that is intended to provide those banks with
liquidity which are otherwise unable to obtain liquidity via the interbank market an additional
agent is introduced. The only task of this agent is to inelastically supply liquidity on the interbank
market. In the following this agent is called “central bank”. The central bank assumes an active
role in the model if it is of the opinion that a bank i is unable to obtain the desired liquidity
at d = 1. In this case the central bank decides to increase the liquidity supply via its main
reﬁnancing operations which enables a bank i to obtain liquidity. As a result of this policy a
bank n is no longer involved in the lending process. As a lender of last resort the central bank
by assumption does not engage in a ﬁnancial analysis of individual counterparties. Moreover,
the central bank does not conjecture the equilibrium strategy aq 2 f0;ag. Thus, the portfolio
decision aq of bank i is only restricted by the level of c, that is, the costs related to the risky
portfolio decision aq = a. If c  c0 holds, bank i will set aq = a and aq = 0 if the costs are too
high, that is, if c  c00 holds.
c  c
0 ) (a
H = a;a
L = a) (VI)
c  c
00 ) (a
H = 0;a
L = 0) (VII)
The positive effect of the direct liquidity assistance by the central bank in this model is that
a bank i in need of liquidity is not forced to liquidate its asset portfolio to obtain the required
liquidity. But at the same time the liquidity policy of the central bank impedes the adjustment
process which would lead to a new equilibrium which is characterized by a new level of balance
sheet risk. As a result the central bank is able to reduce the liquidity risk but the level of coun-
terparty risk remains unaltered as banks are reluctant to actively reduce their exposures. In the
model this corresponds to a situation where the earnings reports of a bank i contains no useful
information to update the prior belief about the portfolio quality distribution in the interbank
market. Hence, the posterior belief is identical to the prior belief. This view is also conﬁrmed
by Figure 2.5 which calculates the risk premium for the Euro area as the difference between the
three-month EURIBOR and the overnight index swap rate (EONIA). Using CDS prices this risk
premium is divided between a credit risk premium and a liquidity risk premium. According to
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this graph the risk premium in the Euro area interbank market is the result of the counterparty
risk prevailing in the market. Another drawback of the liquidity policy is that a central bank
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Figure 2.5: Breakdown of the 3-month Risk Premium in the Euro area Interbank Market
Source: Sveriges Riksbank (2012)
cannot control the risk-taking behavior of banks as it supplies liquidity to a bank i inelastically,
that is, it does not differentiate between a bank i which demands liquidity to set aq = 0 and a
bank i which sets aq = a and invests the liquidity in a risky portfolio Y with a lower expected
return and a higher variance compared to portfolio X. Hence, the liquidity policy of the central
bank can lead to a higher overall level of balance sheet risk compared to the market equilibrium
where interbank liquidity is provided by interbank lending banks n.
2.5 Conclusion
The framework developed in this paper contributes to the literature which tries to explain the
behavior of banks on the interbank market and especially the lending behavior of banks in this
market. The model consists of interbank borrowing banks which exhibit strategic behavior in
their portfolio risk decision and interbank lending banks which have imperfect information about
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the balance sheet risk of interbank borrowing banks. The model results indicate that the higher
the uncertainty about the borrower quality and hence the higher the uncertainty about the coun-
terparty risk involved in interbank lending, the less willing an interbank lending bank is to lend
on the interbank market. Moreover, the model implies that under certain conditions interbank
lending constitutes a market disciplining device whereby a lending bank is able to inﬂuence the
risk-taking of the borrowing bank.
According to this model the interbank market can be revived if the supervisory authority imposes
higher transparency standards for the reporting of balance sheet risks by banks. Moreover, the
model predicts that the level of counterparty risk in the interbank market remains unaltered as
the liquidity policy of the central bank inhibits the adjustment process in the balance sheet of an
interbank lending bank. Another disadvantage of a central bank’s liquidity policy revealed by
the present model is that because the central bank supplies liquidity to a bank i inelastically it is
unable to control the risk-taking behavior of banks.
A possible avenue for further research would be to allow for multiple reﬁnancing sources by each
lending bank. As a result there will be a coordination problem among all interbank lending banks
lending to the same bank as the lending decision of one bank will depend on the conjecture about
the lending decision of all the other banks. Another possibility to enrich the current analysis is to
consider a dynamic setting where each period a new cohort of banks demands liquidity on the in-
terbankmarketandthelendingdecisioninthecurrentperioddependsontheposteriorprobability
that a lending bank has a high quality balance sheet. This would allow to make a statement about
the persistence of interbank liquidity dry-ups and the effect of the liquidity policy of a central
bank on the interbank lending behavior over time. A further extension would be to incorporate
explicitly the liquidity policy of the central bank into the strategic decision making process of
both an interbank borrowing bank i and an interbank lending bank n. In this case the portfolio
decision of a bank i as well as the lending policy of a bank n would become a function of the
probability that a bank n obtains liquidity from the central bank at d = 1. Finally, at this point
no welfare analysis is provided to assess the liquidity policy of a central bank from a normative
point of view. Hence a welfare analysis could give a better guideline for the way central banks
design their liquidity policies.
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Market Discipline in the German Bank
Bond Market: An Empirical Analysis
3.1 Introduction
The third pillar introduced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in the second Basel
accords (‘Basel II’) was intended to strengthen the market discipline by imposing speciﬁc dis-
closure requirements on banks to help market participants in their assessment of a bank’s capital
adequacy and other risk parameters of an individual bank. The rationale for the introduction of
a third pillar was to reduce the asymmetric information between the bank and potential investors
and to ensure a continuous monitoring by the market in addition to a less frequent evaluation
of a bank by the national supervisory authority. Given the information about a bank’s capital
adequacy and its exposure to several kinds of risk it is expected that investors’ required return
is higher the higher the reported risks and the lower the levle of capital which is able to absorb
losses stemming from those risks. But do market participants assume the role meant for them
by the supervisory authority? Do bank debt holders execute their power to contain bank risk by
asking for higher spreads if banks increase their risk-taking?
The agency theory of the ﬁrm developed in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980) pre-
dicts that in the presence of asymmetric information and costly monitoring, the interests of the
decision maker in the ﬁrm and the investors in the ﬁrm’s capital are not aligned and hence the
risk taken by the ﬁrm might be too high. This provides the rationale for the supervision of banks.
The idea that the supervision by market participants complements the efforts by the supervi-
sory authority has been empirically assessed ﬁrst by Flannery and Sorescu (1996) and Berger
et al. (2000). Bliss and Flannery (2001) emphasize that market discipline is a combination of
“monitoring” and “inﬂuence”. The aspect of monitoring by the market participants requires that
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investors are perfectly informed about a bank’s risk level and use this information to determine
the fair market price. The second component of market discipline requires that a bank adjusts
its level of bank risk given that it is monitored by market participants to avoid an increase in its
future funding costs.
Most empirical studies examine market discipline with a focus on monitoring, that is, the ﬁrst
component of market discipline and have a focus on the banking industry in the United States.
For example, Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Jagtiani et al. (2002), and Covitz et al. (2004) ex-
amine how market discipline was affected by a change to the setup of the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation introduced by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
(“FDICIA”). As a result of this change in the legal framework in 1991 where the US government
basically committed itself to a “no bail-out”-strategy, studies which examine US data of the post-
FDICIA period ﬁnd that bondholders are effectively monitoring bank risk. An assessment of the
degree of market discipline in the European banking industry has been done by Sironi (2003).
In this paper, we will focus on the monitoring aspect of market discipline and collect evidence
on the existence of efﬁcient monitoring of German banks in the bank bond market by testing
whether bond holders are sensitive to changes in the riskiness of a bank. The result of this anal-
ysis gives regulators a better insight to which extent supervisory authorities can rely on market
discipline to keep in check banks’ risk-taking. We contribute to the existing literature by con-
structing a rich data set which contains bond speciﬁc and bank speciﬁc information to analyze
market discipline in the German bank bond market. To our knowledge there is only one other
study by Pﬁngsten, Straeter, and Wissing (2008) which uses German bank data but they focus
on deposits of German savings banks. We in contrast use data on commercial banks, savings
banks, and credit unions and concentrate on uncovered bank bonds. In addition, we examine
if the degree of market discipline varies over time. This is especially interesting in the light of
the recent ﬁnancial crisis which began in August 2007 and peaked in the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008. To tackle this hypothesis, we test for multiple unknown breaks in
the relation between bank risk variables and bond spreads. A recent study by Palvia and Patro
(2011) uses a panel of large commercial and investment banks in the United States to examine the
ability of market participants to monitor the risk-taking behavior of banks. However, while we
employ a structural break analysis to endogenously determine the point at which the relationship
between bond spreads and certain bank speciﬁc variables changes they deﬁne the crisis period
exogenously.
The paper is organized as follows. In section two, we describe the data and variables used in our
analysis. In section three, we test for the existence of market discipline in the German bank bond
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market and use a structural break analysis to examine if the ﬁnancial crisis signiﬁcantly changed
the relationship between bank risk and the yield spread. Finally section four concludes.
3.2 Data Description
For our empirical analysis we use data collected at three different levels which are assumed to
have an impact on the interest rate a bank has to offer on its bond issue to attract investors. The
ﬁrst subset of variables used in the regression are those related to the level of a single bond
issue. Those variables are complemented by variables which convey information on the level of
the issuing bank. Finally by incorporating data at the macroeconomic level we account for the
general economic environment in which all banks included in the sample operate.
Because we are interested in the effect of bank-speciﬁc characteristics on the yield of a bank
bond, the bond-speciﬁc information as well as the data collected at the macroeconomic level
act as control variables to identify the effect of bank-speciﬁc variables on the bond yield of an
individual bank.
3.2.1 Data Sources
As part of the banking statistics each bank reports several characteristics about their active bond
issues to the German Bundesbank on a monthly basis. The data of each bond issue comprises
information on the yield of the bond at issuance, the price at which the bond has been sold on the
primary market at a speciﬁc point in time, the original maturity, the number of months remaining
until maturity at the time of the sale, the coupon rate, and the total volume of bonds outstanding
for each issue.
In our analysis, we concentrate on the subset of bonds which are listed on the stock exchange to
ensure market adequate pricing. We focus our attention on the primary market for bank bonds
in order to avoid irregularities, for example, with respect to quoted prices at which no trade has
occurred. Usually, banks do not place the entire bond issue at once but rather stretch it over
several months or even years. For a large fraction of bonds we therefore have more than one
observation over time. On average, we have 14 observations per bond.
The bond speciﬁc information covers bank bond issues of fourteen years between January 1998
and January 2011. We deliberately choose to exclude bonds backed by mortgages as well as
those secured by loans to the public sector as their yield will by a large extent not depend on
the individual characteristics of the issuing institution. Moreover, due to the explicit guarantees
on the level of federal states and local governments we exclude bank bond issues by savings
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banks before August 2005. Furthermore, our sample includes only ﬁxed-coupon bonds and
zero-coupon bonds. We explicitly exclude ﬂoating rate bonds and non-Euro denominated bonds.
Finally, as our focus is on the capital market we exclude all bonds which do not have a maturity
or time to maturity of at least 12 months. The evolution of the bond volume comprised of
those bonds which satisfy the above criteria are depicted in ﬁgure 3.1. From the beginning of the
sample until the end of the year 2005 the bond volume issued by the banks included in the sample
was more or less constant. In the period from 2006 until 2009 the issued bond volume increases.
Especially at the beginning of the year 2008 the bond volume jumped up and remained on a
high level until the end of the year 2009. This is explainable by the increased capital demand of
banks on the one hand and tensions on the interbank market which led to a shift in the ﬁnancing
sources. The sharp decline in the volume of uncovered bonds since 2009 is caused by a shift
to covered bank bond issues which are backed by high quality collateral. Data on bank speciﬁc 050000001.00e+071.50e+07Bond Volume1998m12000m12002m12004m12006m12008m12010m12012m1 Date
Figure 3.1: Bond Volume
characteristics includes both balance sheet data from the balance sheet statistics reported to the
German Bundesbank as well as supplementary data found in various annexes to the balance sheet
statistics which allow to obtain more detailed information about speciﬁc balance sheet positions.
Anothersource ofissuer-speciﬁcdata isregulatoryinformation whicharereported totheGerman
Bundesbank to prove compliance with banking supervision requirements. The frequency of this
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data ranges from monthly to yearly. In cases where data is not available on a monthly basis we
keep the value ﬁxed until new information is available. Due to different frequencies at which
bank speciﬁc information is provided, the data on bank speciﬁc characteristics is distorted if
mergers of banks occurred. In the higher frequency data, the information is based on the merged
institution, while the lower frequency data is still based on the pre-merger institution. Therefore,
we only take into account those bonds which are issued until the day of the merger and after the
end of the year where the merger took place.
Finally, the data on macroeconomic and ﬁnancial time series are either obtained from the public
available macroeconomic time series database provided by the German Bundesbank or from
Datastream.
3.2.2 Variables
The dependent variable employed in the regression is the spread between the yield to maturity
on a bank bond and the current yield of a German government bond listed on the stock exchange
with an equivalent time to maturity. The bond issuing institution reports the yield on a bank
bond to the Bundesbank. We also calculate the yield based on the information about the price
at the time of the sale, the size of the coupon, and the time to maturity in order to check the
correctness of the reported bond yields. The time series for the yield on a German government
bond with a given time to maturity is estimated by the Svensson (1994) method which is based
on the method developed by Nelson and Siegel (1987) and is available from the macroeconomic
time series database of the German Bundesbank. The resulting spread gives an indication about
the risk premium required by investors who rather invest in a risky bank bond than in a low risk
German government bond. Figure 3.2 depicts the evolution of the median of the spread calcu-
lated from the bank bonds contained in the sample together with the spread between the current
yield on bank bonds and German government bonds as calculated by the German Bundesbank.
Although quantitatively different the median of the spread calculated from the bonds in our sam-
ple is a good representation of the spread calculated by the German Bundesbank. We divide the
set of independent variables into two subsets: variables of interest and control variables. Bond-
speciﬁc as well as aggregate macroeconomic and ﬁnancial time series belong to the latter class,
bank-speciﬁc variables to the former. In line with the CAMEL approach developed at the U.S.
Federal Reserve Bank, we use Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management quality, Earnings,
and Liquidity to assess the quality of a bank. Furthermore, we add balance sheet size to the anal-
ysis. The lower the quality of a bank, the higher is its default risk and ultimately the bank bond’s
risk premium demanded by investors. Hence, if market discipline is present in the German bank
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Figure 3.2: Bond Spread
bond market, there should be a negative relationship between the spread and the riskiness of a
bank.
Capital adequacy is measured as the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets. If this ratio
increases the banks ability to absorb losses increases and the probability of default decreases.
Hence, the regression coefﬁcient on the capital adequacy should be negative as it reduces the
risk premium of a bank bond. Asset quality will be measured by the ratio of the non-performing
loans relative to the size of the overall loan portfolio. Because assets which are held in the trad-
ing book need to be marked-to-market it is hard to measure the asset quality of these assets.
Nevertheless, as the loan portfolio of banks makes up a large fraction of a bank’s balance sheet
the non-performing loans ratio is a good proxy to the overall balance sheet quality of a bank.
Because those write-offs reduce the capital of a bank and hence reduces the bank’s ability to
pay interest on the bank bond, we expect that the effect on the spread is positive. Management
quality is captured by bank-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects as management qualities are not easily observ-
able and are likely to be time-invariant. The earnings situation of a bank will be proxied by the
return earned on its assets. Higher proﬁtability generally informs the investor about the success
of the investment and business strategy followed by the bank. If the return on assets (“RoA”)
increases, the bank’s proﬁt will increase and hence the probability to fulﬁll its debt obligations
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will increase. As a result we hypothesize that there is a negative relationship between the RoA
and the spread. The liquidity of a bank is measured as the sum of liquid assets which are deﬁned
as those assets which can be quickly turned into cash without being too dependent on the current
market environment. These assets comprise the most liquid asset, namely cash, central bank de-
posits, short-term debt securities issued by the government, and money market funds. We do not
include positions from the ﬁxed income and stock portfolio as although they can be regarded as
highly liquid they can be sometimes sold only at high discounts. Finally, we include the balance
sheet size of a bank in the regression to proxy for the systemic importance of a bank. If a bank
maintains a large balance sheet it is expected that it is well-connected to other banks in the ﬁ-
nancial system. The sign of the coefﬁcient on balance sheet size in the regression depends on the
net effect of two counteracting forces. If a bank is highly interconnected with other banks, the
probability increases that this bank is affected by shocks emanating from another bank. This ef-
fect can be offset by the expectation that such a highly connected bank is deemed as systemically
important and hence enjoys the beneﬁt of being rescued by the government. Table 3.1 shows
the summary statistics for the bank speciﬁc variables in our regression. Except for the earnings
variable, we will use the log of the bank speciﬁc variables in the regressions.
Variable Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
Spread (in bps) 26.86 12.20 55.64 -186.30 322.80
Earnings (in %) 0.13 0.14 0.30 -2.30 2.18
Asset Quality (in %) 4.80 3.58 4.19 0.11 29.4764
Capital Adequacy (in %) 9.55 8.55 3.52 4.03 29.06
Liquidity (in %) 1.77 1.40 1.44 0.02 12.76
Size (in bn Euro) 133 3.59 184  0 1910
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
We now turn to the bond speciﬁc control variables. The ease with which the bond can be turned
into cash is likely to affect the bond spread. If the bond cannot be turned into cash easily an
investor demands an illiquidity premium. Hence, the higher the liquidity of a bond, the lower
will be the illiquidity premium and the lower will be the spread. A common liquidity measure
ﬁrst proposed by Fisher (1959) is the volume of bonds outstanding. The hypothesis is that the
larger the bond issue, the higher is the trading volume and the higher are the chances that a bond
can be easily sold. Because we do not have numbers on the trading volumes of individual bank
bonds, we include the volume of a bond issue as a proxy for its trading volume and hypothesize
that the coefﬁcient has a negative sign.
Besides bond liquidity we incorporate information on the time to maturity into our regression.
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By substracting the yield of a German government bond with an equivalent time to maturity, the
effect of the term premium required by an investor as compensation for the longer investment
horizon is already partialled out. Therefore, we do not include the time to maturity itself but
the distance in months between the time to maturity of the bank bond and the time to maturity
of an equivalent German government bond. This is necessary as the smallest difference in the
maturities for government bonds is one year. Given the way we deﬁne this variable it is expected
that the coefﬁcient on this control variable is positive.
Finally, we consider macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables which affect all banks alike. To
control for the general level of liquidity in the market for bank bonds, we incorporate the volume
of outstanding bank bonds across all maturities at each point in time as a measure of aggregate
bond liquidity in the regression. We expect to obtain a negative coefﬁcient on this variable,
as a higher level of liquidity in the aggregate bank bond market should decrease the illiquidity
premium on each individual bond. Because the stock market performance of a company depends
ontheinvestor’sassessmentaboutthecompany’sfutureproﬁtabilityandastockindexreﬂectsthe
development of the individual stocks contained in that index we include the stock performance
subindex “DAX Banks” which contains all listed German banks as a proxy for the general level
of proﬁtability among German banks. If the index rises the proﬁtability in the banking sector
is expected to increase which decreases the default risk and leads to an increase in bond prices.
Thus, the spread should vary negatively with the stock market. As a proxy for the volatility on
the German bond market we include the volatility of the German stock index DAX measured by
the VDAX. Because a higher volatility in the stock market indicates a higher level of uncertainty
and is expected to translate into higher volatility in the bond market as well, our hypothesis is
that the effect on the VDAX on the spread variable should be positive.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
In the ﬁrst part of our empirical analysis, we test whether banks in the bank bond market are
subject to market discipline exerted by potential investors. We regress the spread of uncovered
bank bonds at the day of their issuance on bank speciﬁc characteristics while controlling for
bond speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables. In the second part, we test whether the enforcement
of market discipline changes over time. In order to test for a structural break at unknown time,
we use the sequential testing procedure proposed by Bai and Perron (1998) and use the critical
values derived therein.
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3.3.1 Existence of Market Discipline
In this section, we collect evidence for the existence of market discipline in the German bond
market. In doing so, we differentiate between weak and strong form of market discipline. In line
with the focus of Basel II on risk-weighted assets and Tier 1 capital, we consider the negative
relation between capital adequacy the bond spread as a minimum requirement for market disci-
pline. In short, at least the coefﬁcient of capital adequacy should be signiﬁcantly different from
zero and negative. Basel III emphasizes the so far underestimated importance of liquidity. In line
with this, strong market discipline exists if not only the level of a bank’s capital adequacy but
also liquidity risk is reﬂected in the price of a bond. The coefﬁcient on liquidity should hence
be signiﬁcant and negative. If only the former and not the latter requirement is fulﬁlled, we will
refer to it as the weak form of market discipline.
In our empirical analysis on the existence of market discipline, we consider the following ﬁxed
effects regression:
Spreadit = i + t + 1cit + 2ait + 3eit + 4lit + 5sit + 
Bit + Ft + "it (3.1)
where i denotes the bank speciﬁc ﬁxed effects which control for unobservable, time-invariant
factors: amongst others but in particular the banks’ management quality. The Hausman test
conﬁrms that accounting for ﬁxed-effects is necessary: With a p-value of 0:00, we reject the
hypothesis that the coefﬁcients of a random effects model and a ﬁxed effects model are equal.
Further, we include quarterly time-dummies, t, to account for time variation which is not cap-
tured by our macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables contained in the variable matrix Ft.
In addition to these time variables, we account for the possibility that the overall level of the
spread changes in the observed period. In particular, we thought of the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
Therefore, we endogenously determine the structural break-point using the max-F-statistic de-
veloped by Andrews (1993). With a test statistic equal to 194, we concluded that the structural
break found in December 2007 is signiﬁcant at the 1%-signiﬁcance level and incorporated the
resulting crisis dummy as another macroeconomic variable in the matrix Ft. The most impor-
tant variables in our empirical analysis are the variables capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings,
liquidity and size which are included in the regressions to capture bank risk. The bond-speciﬁc
variables, bond liquidity and maturity are subsumed in matrix Bit. Finally, "it denotes the resid-
ual of the ﬁxed effects regression.
Estimation results are reported in the ﬁrst column of Table 3.2. We do not ﬁnd evidence for
market discipline as neither capital adequacy nor bank liquidity are signiﬁcant at the 10%-level.
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The only variables of interest which are signiﬁcant are asset quality and size. The positive co-
efﬁcient of asset quality is signiﬁcant at the 10% signiﬁcance level and indicates that investors
do price in the risk stemming from non-performing loans. The positive sign for balance sheet
size indicates that larger banks have to pay more on their debt. One possible explanation for this
result is, that larger banks are expected to be more vulnerable to shocks from the national and in-
ternational ﬁnancial system as they are deemed to exhibit a higher degree of connectedness with
other ﬁnancial institutions. This ﬁnding can be interpreted as modest evidence against the lack
of market discipline as the opposite sign would be in line with the “too-big-to-fail”-hypothesis
that large banks are expected to enjoy an implicit state-guarantee. Almost all control variables
are signiﬁcant at least at the 5% signiﬁcance level and have the correct sign. Exceptions are the
market size, which is insigniﬁcant, and bond liquidity which has the wrong sign. A reason for
the latter might be that the volume of outstanding bonds is a poor proxy for liquidity. However,
the sign of the latter is robust across several proxies for bond liquidity such as the bond liquidity
relative to the total bond volume in that period, the Amihud ratio proposed in Amihud (2002) or
the bond age. To include bond age is motivated by the observation of Sarig and Warga (1989)
that the liquidity of a bond decreases with its age. Based on our previous deﬁnition we conclude
that there is no evidence for market discipline although we ﬁnd some weak evidence for risk-
adequate pricing.
In order to ensure that our results are not driven by outliers, we conduct an outlier analysis. To
that aim, we compute the standard deviation of the residual "it from the ﬁxed effects regres-
sion (3.1). An observation is then deﬁned to be an outlier if the corresponding residual is larger
(smaller) than (minus) two standard deviations. In that way, we identify and eliminate 454 obser-
vations as they have the potential to distort the regression results. The spreads removed from the
sample range from -402 bps to +4625 bps. The estimation results of the outlier adjusted sample
can be found in the second column of Table 3.2.
While the ﬁt of the model, in terms of R-squared, has increased notably from 0.19 to 0.54, the
adjustment changes the estimation results only quantitatively. Neither capital adequacy nor liq-
uidity are signiﬁcant at the 10% level. In contrast to the estimation on the whole sample, asset
quality becomes insigniﬁcant and earnings become signiﬁcantly positive at the 10% signiﬁcance
level. Unexpectedly, investors seem to associate a high return on assets with more risk since
they demand a higher risk premium. Coefﬁcients and signiﬁcance of the control variables do not
change notably, with the expectation of the market size which becomes signiﬁcant and has the
expected sign. To conclude, despite of a better ﬁt, the estimation results do not convey evidence
on the existence of market discipline.
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whole sample outlier adjusted
Independent Variables coefﬁcient std.dev. coefﬁcient std.dev.
Earnings 0.979 [2.193] 1.524* [0.899]
Log(Asset Quality) 0.021* [0.012] -0.005 [0.005]
Log(Capital Adequacy) 0.035 [0.038] 0.017 [0.016]
Log(Liquidity) 0.008 [0.009] -0.004 [0.004]
Log(Size) 0.086** [0.040] 0.081*** [0.016]
Log(Bond Market Size) -0.641 [0.458] -1.205*** [0.187]
Log(Stock Market) -0.487*** [0.077] -0.383*** [0.032]
Stock Market Volatility 0.004** [0.002] 0.005*** [0.001]
Crisis Dummy 0.316*** [0.057] 0.334*** [0.023]
Bond Liquidity 0.022*** [0.003] 0.022*** [0.001]
Time to maturity (residual) 0.219*** [0.017] 0.172*** [0.007]
Observations 26483 26029
Number of Banks 148 148
R-squared 0.192 0.540
Note: We include bank-ﬁxed effects and time dummies for all quarters
except for 1998Q1. Standard errors in brackets. Signiﬁcance: *** p <
0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
Table 3.2: Fixed Effects Regression before and after Outlier Adjustments
The sample exhibits a large amount of heterogeneity as it contains both small regional institutes
as well as large, global players. Although we include both bank ﬁxed effects in order to account
for differences in the management quality and the business model as well as a bank’s balance
sheet size to account for the size and importance of an individual bank, we decide to split up the
sample into three groups according to a bank’s size. In line with Penas and Unal (2004) we deﬁne
a bank as small if its share in the total assets of the German banking system is lower than 0.35%.1
Moreover, a bank is referred to as large if the fraction of its total assets relative to the total assets
of the German banking system is larger than 2%. The estimation result of the three subsamples
can be found in Table 3.3.2 Again, we do not ﬁnd evidence for market discipline in the German
bank bond market: While capital adequacy is not signiﬁcant at the 10% level for small and large
banks, it is signiﬁcant at the 1% level for medium size banks. However, the sign differs from the
sign we expected. Investors seem to deem banks with less capital to be more proﬁtable ignoring
the potential risk this bears. Earnings remain signiﬁcant for medium and large banks. Asset
1 The total assets of the German banking system is provided by Deutsche Bundesbank in its macroeconomic time-
series database
2 As the outlier analysis is performed independently for the full sample and the subsamples by bank size the number
of banks and the observations across the three subsamples do not add up to the numbers from the full sample.
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quality exhibits a signiﬁcantly positive sign in line with risk-adequate pricing for small banks but
the opposite and signiﬁcant sign for large banks. Liquidity is signiﬁcantly negative indicating
market discipline for medium sized banks but is signiﬁcantly positive for large banks. Size is sig-
niﬁcantly positive for small and medium-sized banks. Interestingly, in contrast to the estimation
results for the full sample which did not support the “too-big-to-fail”-hypothesis after splitting
up the sample the coefﬁcient on size becomes signiﬁcant and negative for large banks which is
actually in line with the “too-big-to-fail”-hypothesis that banks can reﬁnance themselves cheaper
due to an implicit state guarantee.
3.3.2 Time Variance of Market Discipline
To examine if at least for speciﬁc periods we are able to identify market discipline in the Ger-
man bank bond market we allow for two structural breaks at unknown time in our bank-speciﬁc
variables (not including bank ﬁxed effects). For the determination of the breaks we resort to the
sequential testing procedure proposed by Bai and Perron (1998) and for inference purposes to
the critical values derived therein. The equation used for the sequential testing procedure is given
below:
Spreadit = i + t + 0Xit +
m X
j=1
Xit Dt(j) + 
Bit + Ft + it (3.2)
The matrix Xit contains the bank speciﬁc variables capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings,
liquidity and size. For those variables, we endogenously determine two break dates and test for
their signiﬁcance. The variable Dt(j) is a step dummy variable deﬁned as follows:
Dt(j) =
(
1; t = [jT] + 1;:::;[j+1T]
0; else
(3.3)
where m takes the values 1 or 2 depending on the number of breaks tested. In the former case,
j = 1, in the latter case j = 1;2. The parameter j varies in the interval [";1   "] where the re-
striction
Tj Tj 1
T  " = 0:05 ensures that there are at least 9 months (=5% of all month) between
two breaks. The ﬁrst endogenous break point is the one for which the joint F-tests on Xit Dt(1)
is largest. In order to determine whether this break is signiﬁcant, we compare the test statistic
with the critical values tabulated by Bai and Perron (1998) for m = 1. The analysis is repeated
for the subsample before and after the ﬁrst break. The second break date, 2 is the one for which
the F-test statistics computed for both subsamples is largest. Again, signiﬁcance is determined
using the tabulated critical values for m = 2. The tables with the regression results are found in
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Appendix 3.A
We test for a structural break in the full sample and detect two structural breaks: The ﬁrst in
April 2008 and the second in September 2009. In Table 3.4, coefﬁcients and standard deviations
of our variables of interest in the three different time periods are presented. Based on our deﬁni-
tion of market discipline, we do not ﬁnd evidence for market discipline before September 2009.
However, in the period September 2009 until the end of the sample period in January 2012, the
coefﬁcients of capital adequacy and of liquidity have the correct sign and are signiﬁcant at the
1% level. Hence, we conclude that the German bank bond market exhibits strong market disci-
pline since September 2009. In addition, the coefﬁcient of asset quality related to the amount
of non-performing loans is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In addition, earnings are
positively related to the spread which is in line with our expectations in case market discipline
does exist. It is interesting to observe that the coefﬁcient of capital adequacy is positive before
April 2008, is insigniﬁcant for the period between the ﬁrst and second break point, and becomes
negative for the time period after September 2009. Qualitatively the same development can be
observed for liquidity as well. The coefﬁcient of liquidity is insigniﬁcant before April 2008 but
becomes highly signiﬁcant and has the correct sign thereafter. This can be interpreted as a sign
of an increase in the awareness of investors that banks are subject to liquidity risk after April
2008. To conclude, the structural break analysis reveals that for the time after September 2009
the German bank bond market is characterized by strong market discipline.
We reﬁne the structural break analysis and examine if the change in the market discipline in the
full sample can be attributed to a subset of banks. For that reason we assign, as before, each bank
to one of three subsets according to their balance sheet size relative to the sum of total assets
of the German banking system. Based on the structural break analysis for each subset of banks
we ﬁnd that neither small nor large banks are responsible for the compliance with the strong
deﬁnition of market discipline observed in the full sample.
For the subset of small banks we ﬁnd only one signiﬁcant break in March 2008. From the es-
timation results depicted in Table 3.5 in Appendix 3.A we conclude that there is evidence for
strong market discipline before March 2008 but no evidence for market discipline afterwards. A
tentative explanation for this result is, that investors usually expect that small banks are allowed
to fail and therefore price their risk adequately. However, in the crisis, investors might have seen
the credit supply-oriented business model especially of small savings banks and unions as “save
haven” compared to larger banks. In line with that, asset quality measured by the fraction of
non-performing loans became more important since the crisis.
Estimation results for the subsample of large banks are shown in Table 3.7 in Appendix 3.A. We
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ﬁnd weak market discipline as the sign capital adequacy is negative and signiﬁcant at the 1%
level after the ﬁrst break detected in January 2005 and continues to be signiﬁcant and negative
after the second break in October 2009. However, liquidity is not adequately priced throughout
the sample period. This might be the case because investors expect that large institutions will
receive emergency liquidity assistance if their liquidity is seriously constrained. Interestingly,
the coefﬁcient of size is positive before 2005, as is the case for the smaller banks. However,
after 2005, size reduces the bond spread providing evidence for the “too-big-to-fail”-hypothesis.
This reﬁnancing advantage comes to an end after the end of 2009, when the coefﬁcient of size
becomes insigniﬁcant. An explanation for this result might be the increased international effort
to ensure that large institutions can fail without causing unbearable costs to the real economy.
Examples of such efforts are discussions in the context of Basel III on living wills as well as the
adoption of a EU law on bank resolution.
From the estimation results presented in Table 3.6 in Appendix 3.A we conclude that the sub-
sample of medium size banks drives the results of the overall sample. The coefﬁcient of capital
adequacy indicates that only after the second break point in November 2009, a higher Tier 1
capital ratio decreases the spread between the bank bond and an equivalent German government
bond. The coefﬁcient of liquidity is negative and highly signiﬁcant for the whole sample period.
This indicates, that investors increase their risk premium in case of an increase in liquidity risk
and do not expect medium sized banks to receive emergency liquidity assistance. From our ﬁnd-
ings, we conclude that medium size banks are subject to the strong form of market discipline
after November 2009.
Based on the empirical analysis conducted we conclude that it is important to distinguish be-
tween small, medium and large banks and at the same time to allow for structural breaks to be
able to conﬁrm the existence of market discipline in the German bank bond market. Due to this
approach, we detected that small banks have been subject to the strong form of market discipline
only until roughly the outburst of the recent ﬁnancial crisis. In contrast, large banks are subject
to the weak form of market discipline since 2005 and the degree of market discipline did not
change in response to the recent crisis. In addition, it is worthwhile mentioning that the “too-
big-to-fail-subsidy” came to an end in late-2009. For medium sized banks we ﬁnd evidence that
they are subject to strong market discipline since November 2009. Overall, the results can be
interpreted as positive. Since 2009, market discipline is in place for medium and large banks.
However, policy makers must stick to their proposed reform agenda as it is important to conserve
the existing level of market discipline.
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3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we construct a dataset which contains both bank speciﬁc and bond speciﬁc infor-
mation to analyze whether bank bond spreads in the primary market respond to the riskiness of
banks if one controls for bond speciﬁc and macroeconomic effects. In line with the CAMEL
approach developed at the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, we focus our attention on the bank spe-
ciﬁc variables capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings and liquidity and additionally size. In our
analysis, we differentiate between weak and strong form of market discipline. In line with the
focus of Basel II on risk-weighted assets and Tier 1 capital, we consider the negative relation
between capital adequacy and the bond spread as a minimum requirement for market discipline
to exist. Basel III emphasizes the so far underestimated importance of liquidity. In line with this,
strong market discipline exists if not only capital adequacy but also liquidity risk is considered
in the market price of a bank bond in the primary market. If only the former and not the latter
requirement is fulﬁlled we will refer to it as the weak form of market discipline.
The results of our paper suggest that it is important to distinguish between small, medium and
large banks and at the same time to allow for structural breaks in order to uncover market dis-
cipline in the German bank bond market. In a ﬁrst step we analyze if the German bank bond
market as a whole shows signs of weak or strong market discipline by means of a ﬁxed effects
regression. The regression results indicate that bond spreads in the German bank bond market
do not show signs of market discipline. Neither of the strong nor of the weak form. In a second
step we split up the sample into three groups according to a bank’s size and examine if market
discipline is more important for a subsample of banks. The results vary across subsamples but
for neither of the subsamples the existence of market discipline can be conﬁrmed for the whole
sample period. In the last step of our empirical analysis we allow for two structural breaks to
examine if the market discipline within each of the subsamples has been subject to variations
over time given that market discipline could not be conﬁrmed for the whole sample period in the
previous step. In this step we found out that small banks have been subject to strong market dis-
cipline only until roughly the outburst of the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Large banks are considered
as being weakly disciplined by the bond market since 2005. In addition the degree of market dis-
cipline exerted on large banks did not change as a reaction to the recent ﬁnancial crisis. However,
it is worthwhile mentioning that since late-2009 banks no longer enjoy a reﬁnancing advantage
because of their sheer size. Another interesting result found in this last step of our empirical
analysis is that medium sized banks are strongly disciplined by markets since November 2009.
Overall we come to the conclusion that since the beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis the German
bank bond market exhibits at least a weak form of market discipline for bonds issued by medium
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size and large banks. However, policy makers must stick to their proposed reform agenda as
market discipline has to be conserved. To foster market discipline, policy makers must ensure
that investors obtain sufﬁcient information to evaluate the risk of an individual bank. Further-
more, in order to give investors an incentive to exercise market discipline, policy makers must
take measures which ensure that each bank can fail without causing unbearable damage to the
ﬁnancial system. Things are going in the right direction. On a G20-level, regulators are working
on closing data-gaps for regulatory but also external use. In Germany, the “Restrukturierungs-
gesetz” was a ﬁrst step in order to make an orderly bank resolution more credible. However,
more actions have to be taken especially in the direction of keeping liquidity risk under control.
Current developments in connection with Basel III regarding a net stable funding ratio and a
liquidity coverage ratio aim at a regulatory solution to this problem. However, the regulatory
control exerted by debt markets should not be left aside. In order to give debtholders an incentive
to price liquidity risk correctly, for example, emergency liquidity assistance must be kept at a
minimum.
The current analysis can be extended to the secondary market for bank bonds as well if it can
be ensured that the secondary market prices reported are based on trades and not on quotes on
which no bond turnover has been generated. Another interesting extension would be to comple-
ment the data on losses in the loan portfolio by data on losses made in the bank’s trading book or
at least obtain data on write-offs to the banking book. Such data would be interesting as in Ger-
many banks were more affected by losses on their security portfolio than by losses on their loan
portfolio. At the moment the size of a bank enters only linearly. Hence, the effect of increasing
its size is independent of the level from which a bank starts. However, if there exists a frontier
above which a bank is considered as too-big-to-fail, then the effect of size on the bond spread is
expected to be a step function. After a bank crossed this threshold the effect on the bond yield is
expected to be constant.
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All Banks
Independent Variables 01/1998-03/2008 04=2008-08/2009 09/2009-01/2012
Earnings 2.303* -0.558 4.463**
[1.247] [1.462] [1.795]
Log(Asset Quality) 0.018*** -0.070*** 0.030***
[0.006] [0.009] [0.010]
Log(Capital Adequacy) 0.107*** 0.030 -0.158***
[0.018] [0.022] [0.020]
Log(Liquidity) 0.003 -0.074*** -0.049***
[0.004] [0.007] [0.006]
Log(Size) 0.049*** 0.140*** 0.133***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.017]
Test Statistic 181.70*** 63.03***
Observations Number of Banks R-squared
26029 148 0.561
Note: We include bank-ﬁxed effects and time dummies for all quarters except for 1998Q1
Standard errors in brackets
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
Table 3.4: Structural Break Analysis: All Banks
Small Banks
Independent Variables 01/1998-02/2008 03/2008-01/2012
Return on Assets 12.988** 2.002
[5.624] [1.782]
Log(Asset Quality) -0.027* 0.059***
[0.015] [0.008]
Log(Capital Adequacy) -0.150*** 0.123***
[0.034] [0.030]
Log(Liquidity) -0.051*** -0.007
[0.012] [0.005]
Log(Size) 0.119*** 0.177***
[0.017] [0.017]
Test Statistic 48.13***
Observations Number of Banks R-squared
8770 122 0.490
Note: We include bank-ﬁxed effects and time dummies for all quarters except for 1998Q1
Standard errors in brackets
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
Table 3.5: Structural Break Analysis: Small Banks
903.A Structural Break Analysis
Medium Sized Banks
Independent Variables 01/1998-11/2007 12/2007-10/2009 11/2009-01/2012
Return on Assets 7.993*** 63.102*** -36.990***
[2.571] [4.106] [3.954]
Log(Asset Quality) 0.088*** -0.074*** -0.016
[0.016] [0.016] [0.019]
Log(Capital Adequacy) 0.245*** 0.136*** -0.148***
[0.035] [0.045] [0.038]
Log(Liquidity) -0.029*** -0.142*** -0.074***
[0.007] [0.009] [0.009]
Log(Size) 0.269*** 0.345*** 0.334***
[0.070] [0.069] [0.070]
Test Statistic 108.34*** 101.46***
Observations Number of Banks R-squared
8008 24 0.642
Note: We include bank-ﬁxed effects and time dummies for all quarters except for 1998Q1
Standard errors in brackets
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
Table 3.6: Structural Break Analysis: Medium Size Banks
Large Banks
Independent Variables 01/1998-12/2004 01/2005-09/2009 10/2009-01/2012
Return on Assets -14.820** -0.646 21.824***
[6.299] [1.808] [3.197]
Log(Asset Quality) -0.126*** -0.116*** -0.101***
[0.048] [0.014] [0.025]
Log(Capital Adequacy) 0.313** -0.262*** -0.234***
[0.135] [0.039] [0.062]
Log(Bank Liquidity) 0.059* 0.037*** 0.038**
[0.031] [0.011] [0.017]
Log(Assets) 0.346*** -0.348*** 0.074
[0.104] [0.064] [0.048]
Test Statistic 51.48*** 46.29***
Observations Number of Banks R-squared
9139 12 0.625
Note: We include bank-ﬁxed effects and time dummies for all quarters except for 1998Q1
Standard errors in brackets
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
Table 3.7: Structural Break Analysis: Large Banks
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